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WHY LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS CAN
PAD-LOCK REDISTRICTING PLANS IN
RACIAL-GERRYMANDERING CASES
FRANK ADAMS*

I.

INTRODUCTION~

The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district. To make
this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated
traditional
race-neutral
districting
principles,
including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for
political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interest, to racial considerations.'

This excerpt from the United States Supreme Court's 1995
decision in Miller v. Johnson sets forth the "predominant factor"
test that courts use to determine whether plaintiffs in a racial
gerrymander challenge2 to an electoral district has satisfied their
burden of proving that the district's design violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by discriminating against the plaintiff based
on his or her (or their) membership within a particular racial or
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Adams is an
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opportunity to see his son become an attorney; and, of course, his mother Dr.
Billie W. Adams. Adams also thanks the late Northwestern Law Professor
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.. This article only expresses the view of the author and does
not express the
view of any other individual, attorney, entity, or object.
1. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 902-03 (1995).
2. For purposes of this article, the phrase "racial gerrymander" means the
intentional reliance on race or ethnicity in the design of an electoral district.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1371
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ethnic group, i.e., unconstitutional racial or ethnic discrimination."
In Miller, a majority of the Court declared for the first time' the
standard for courts to use in adjudicating equal-protection racialgerrymander challenges.6
Miller is the second of six cases,

4. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 902-03 (setting forth the plaintiffs burden of
proof in "equal-protection racial-gerrymander claims" or "equal protection
racial gerrymander challenges"). Miller and the other equal protection racial
gerrymander cases decided by the Court have addressed equal protection
claims based only on a theory of racial or ethnic discrimination, e.g., racial
gerrymandering. Id. at 914-20. Accord Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 24157 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 545-54 (1999); Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 957-89 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I/), 517 U.S.
899, 904-18 (1996); Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 639-58 (1993);
United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 148-49
(1977) (plurality opinion). In United Jewish Org., Justice White challenged
the state senate and assembly districts of the New York State legislature
because they divided members of Hasidic Jewish community-the majority
population in the previous design-into two, new electoral districts. In
addition to the development of an equal protection jurisprudence for racial
gerrymander claims, the Court has developed a jurisprudence for so-called
"political gerrymander" claims. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581,
586-97 (2005) (discussing differences between Oklahoma's semiclosed primary
voting system and previous voting systems that the Supreme Court has found
constitutional). Political gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering are
jurisdictionally distinct and this article does not discuss the law relative to
political gerrymandering.
For a discussion of the Court's "political
gerrymander" jurisprudence, see generally Michael Weaver, Uncertainty
Maintained: The Split Decision Over Partisan Gerrymanders in Vieth v.
Jubeliner, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273 (2005); Amy M. Pugh, Unresolved:
Whether a Claim for Political Gerrymandering May Be Brought Under the
First Amendment, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 373 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymanderingand PoliticalCartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (Dec. 2002).
5. Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 902-03 (declaring the equal protection
standard for racial gerrymander challenges), with United Jewish Org., 430
U.S. at 148-49 (plurality opinion) (marking the first time the Court addressed
an equal protection racial gerrymander claim). Id. The plurality in United
Jewish Org. held that the appropriate equal protection standard for racial or
ethnic gerrymander claims against the design of electoral districts is a
proportionate representation standard. Id. Shaw I and its progeny have
eviscerated the "proportionality representation" standard for the adjudication
of racial gerrymandering cases set forth in United Jewish Org. See David M.
Guinn, Christopher W. Chapman & Kathryn S. Knechtel, Redistricting in
2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow Channel Between the Equal
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 225, 227-28
(1999) (discussing the effect of the Shaw I line of cases on the Court's plurality
decision in United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh).
6. A redistricting plan, once approved, is embodied in legislation adopted
by the redistricting entity; usually a statute or ordinance. See, e.g., Miller, 515
U.S. at 902-03 (highlighting Georgia's Congressional redistricting plan
contained in redistricting legislation); see also the Illinois Congressional
Reapportionment Act of 2001, codified at 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 76/5 (2002)

(giving Illinois' current congressional districts); Chen v. City of Houston (Chen
I/), 206 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting the codification of the City of
Houston's 1997 redistricting plan in an ordinance).
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beginning with the Court's 1993 landmark decision in Shaw v.
Reno ("Shaw I"), that attempt to set forth an analytical framework
for courts to use in assessing the merits of a claimant's equalprotection racial-gerrymander claim as well as the governmental
redistricting entity's defense in such cases.
Under the equal protection standard set forth in Miller, if a
claimant establishes that race was the "predominant factor" in the
placement of electoral district boundaries, i.e., in the legislative
decision making relative to the design of one or more electoral
districts within a redistricting plan, then the redistricting plan is
presumed invalid and the burden of proof shifts to the redistricting
entity8 to demonstrate that the challenged plan satisfies the
Court's strict scrutiny test. 9 Once strict scrutiny is triggered, a
redistricting plan will only be upheld if the redistricting entity, in
its own defense, can demonstrate that the use of race by decision
makers in the placement of district boundaries was "narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling [government] interest."" In other
7. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 241-57; Hunt, 526 U.S. at 545-54; Bush, 517
U.S. at 957-89 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 904-18;
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 639-58.
8. Every government entity that elects public officials is a redistricting
entity, and every district within a redistricting entity is redesigned, i.e. at the
time dictated by either the United States Constitution or state statute. Article
I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires State legislatures to
redraw the district boundaries of congressmen and congresswomen within
Congressional redistricting plans as well as their own (state legislative and
senate districts) political districts after the release of every national decennial
census. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 2. State and municipal ordinances determine the
time of reappointment for some state legislatures as well as for county and
local redistricting plans. See Note, The Future of Majority-MinorityDistricts
in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, at
2208 n.8 (May 2003) [hereinafter The Future of Majority-MinorityDistricts];
see also Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 512 (crediting the municipal ordinance for
determining the frequency of the City of Houston's redistricting).
9. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904. In point of fact, the Court's 1995 decision in
Miller setting forth the "predominant factor" test developed and clarified the
holding in Shaw I. Id. In Shaw I the Court recognized, for the first time - as a
matter of pleading - a cause of action for equal protection racial
gerrymandering based solely on the "bizarre" design of a majority-minority
district. Id.; Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 639-58; see also infra discussion at pp. 137587. Hence, the starting point and inception of the Court's current standard for
equal-protection racial-gerrymander claims is Shaw I.Miller, 515 U.S. at 904.
10. Miller, 505 U.S. at 904. In other words, the redistricting entity must
demonstrate that it has used the least restrictive means available its
governmental objective that the Court has recognized and accepted as
sufficiently "compelling." Id. at 904. But, if a redistricting plaintiff does not
successfully demonstrate that the redistricting plan was predominately
motivated by race, then the plan will likely be upheld with the "rational basis"
test, under which a court affirms legislation if it is reasonably related to any
legitimate government objective. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 254-58. It almost
goes without saying that the Court's strict scrutiny test, which originated over
sixty years ago in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), is
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words, the redistricting entity must demonstrate that it has used
the least restrictive means available to achieve a governmental
objective that has been accepted and approved by the Court as
sufficiently "compelling.""
A redistricting entity's attempt to avoid successful application
of the predominant factor test, however, may give rise to a
material conflict between the redistricting entity's attempt to rely
on race or ethnicity in order to comply with the prohibition of vote
dilution in Section 2,12 as well as the non-retrogression principle in
Section 513 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). Such a
scenario is likely when a redistricting entity designs electoral
districts wherein members of a racial or ethnic minority group
(usually either African-American or Latino/Hispanic) 4 constitute a
majority within the electoral district, i.e., a "majority-minority"
district. 15 Indeed, in its attempts to enforce the VRA, the United
States Department of Justice has regularly required redistricting
entities to intentionally rely on race or ethnicity to design
majority-minority districts." At least one of the Court's decisions
after Shaw I recognized that the "intentional creation of a
majority-minority district is not, in and of itself, unconregarded as a near impossible affirmative defense to prove in equal protection
cases. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(describing strict scrutiny as "scrutiny that is strict in theory but fatal in
fact."); Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minoritiesand RacegoatingDynamics of
the Anti-Affirmative Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445, 446-47 (2003). Since 1944 the Court has found the
government satisfied strict scrutiny in only three cases involving equal
protection racial discrimination. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(upholding University of Michigan Law School's race based admission policy
under strict scrutiny); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)
(upholding a district court order requiring a one-for-one hiring as a remedy for
past racial discrimination); Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (upholding an Executive
Order based on a Federal Act that set a curfew for American citizens of
Japanese ancestry in certain geographic areas during World War II).
11. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904.
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
13. Id. at § 1973(c).
14. The racial and/or minority group that constitutes the "majority" in the
majority-minority districts are usually African American or Latino/Hispanic.
See The Future of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 8, at 2208 (defining
"majority-minority" districts to mean districts "in which a majority of the
residents (and often the voters as well) are African-American or Latino");
United Jewish Org., 430 U.S. at 148-49 (plurality opinion).
15. The Future of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 8, at 2208; see
also, Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 (discussing majority-minority districts in relation
to race-based districting that violates Section 5 of the VRA).
16. See Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra note 6, at 227-28 (touching on
the Justice Department's mandate that state legislatures purposefully create
majority-minority districts to withstand constitutional guidelines); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1972(c) (2000) (laying out the guidelines of sections 2 and 5).
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stitutional." 7 However, a redistricting entity is nevertheless
exposed to an equal-protection racial-gerrymander claim under the
Shaw I line of cases and application of the "predominant factor
test under Miller if, in the design of one or more of its majorityminority districts, a redistricting entity subordinates so called
"traditional districting principles""9 to racial considerations. 19
The redistricting regime under the Shaw I line of cases has
proven to be extremely burdensome to voters, legislators,
attorneys, and courts that have adjudicated equal-protection
racial-gerrymander claims directed at majority-minority districts.0
Numerous attempts by redistricting entities to comply with
Miller's predominant factor test, while simultaneously attempting
to adhere to Sections 2 and/or 5 of the VRA, have resulted in an
ongoing and burdensome process of designing one or more
majority-minority districts, defending them in subsequent
litigation based on an equal-protection racial-gerrymander claim,2
17. Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra note 5, at 228; see Bush, 517 U.S.
at 962.
18. So-called "traditional" redistricting criteria are numerous and may
include: population equality; compactness and contiguity; identifiable natural
geographic boundaries such as rivers, mountain ranges, and other unique
geographic configurations; state constitutional and statutory requirements;
use of county voting precincts as benchmarks when drawing districts;
recognition of incumbent-constituent relationships by keeping incumbents in
their districts; and partisan political considerations. Guinn, Chapman &
Knechtel, supra note 5, at 227, 265-66.
19. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (providing a sample of race-neutral
districting principles that a legislature may use); see also Guinn, Chapman &
Knechtel, supra note 5, at 265-67 (listing a more comprehensive sample of
race-neutral considerations).
20. See id. at 227-28 (describing the evolving efforts of practitioners to
rectify the Shaw line of cases with the VRA requirements).
21. Id. Since the Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), holding that equal protection challenges to reapportionment plans are
"justiciable," there have been several theories, constitutional and statutory,
used by claimants to challenge redistricting plans. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F.
Supp. 392, 395 (W.D.N.C. 1992). Among the theories relied on by plaintiffs to
challenge redistricting plans are claims that:
(i) a redistricting plan violates voters' First Amendment right to free
speech by creating a "chilling effect" on voters right to free speech, id. at 39899;
(ii) a redistricting plan violates voters' First Amendment right to free
association, see id.; Chen I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 751;
(iii) a redistricting plan violates the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment, see Pope, 890 F. Supp. at 398-99;
(iv) a redistricting plan violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because voters have been deprived of their
fundamental right to vote, Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 395 n.1; see also Ariz.
Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 284
F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1247 (D. Ariz. 2003) (affirming that states may freely
conduct redistricting provided it does not compromise constitutional
guarantees);
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and then either redesigning the entire plan when the challenged
majority-minority district(s) are invalidated by a court, or
subjecting the redistricting to a court ordered plan. In essence,
this may require adjustments to district boundaries within an
existing plan, causing a ripple effect and the redesigning of other
districts within the existing plan.22 This often leads to years of
political compromise, cut-throat litigation, and a focus on the
minutia and nuances of redistricting law and litigation procedure,
with the concomitant government expenditure of what can amount
to millions of dollars in legal fees for the defense of a redistricting
plan already approved by the legislative process. 3
(v) a redistricting plan violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving voters their right to fair
representation or to an effective vote, Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 399. Cf. O-Lear v.
Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (denying plaintiffs' claim
that the reapportionment plan violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
because the XIV Amendment does not guarantee an effective right to vote);
(vi) a redistricting plan violates the one-person, one-vote guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 2, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 272-73 (2004); see also Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308,
312 (E.D. N.Y. 2003) (describing plaintiffs burden as "formidable" when a
pure one-person, one-vote claim is asserted without a claim including a racial
cause of action); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1964) (reaffirming
the constitutional principle that a person is allowed only one vote);
(vii) a redistricting plan violates the Fifteenth Amendment by diluting the
voting strength of members of an ethnic or racial minority group, see Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 557;
(viii) a redistricting plan violates a state constitutional requirement
defining the number of legislative districts in a municipality, see McNeil v.
Legislative Apportionment Comm'n, 828 A.2d 840, 854-55 (N.J. 2003);
(ix) a redistricting plan violates state constitutional equal protection
standards, see Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting,284 F. Supp. 2d at
1247-48;
(x) a redistricting plan violates a provision of a State's Election Code,
see In re Petition of the Bd. of Dir. of the Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. to Change
an Approved Plan Which Established Nine Regions for Election of Dir. Within
the Dist. Valley Educ. Ass'n., 527 A.2d 1091, 1092 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)
(challenging a district plan that violated a Pennsylvania state election code).
This article, however, does not attempt to set forth an exhaustive discussion of
all of the constitutional and statutory theories which may be used to challenge
redistricting plans and/or electoral districts contained therein. Rather, this
article focuses on the standard that the Court has developed for courts to use
in adjudicating equal protection racial gerrymandering cases in Shaw I and its
progeny.
22. Compare Shaw H, 517 U.S. at 914-20 (invalidating the district plan),
with Barnett v. City of Chicago (Barnett III), 17 F. Supp. 2d 753 (1998)
(approving court ordered plan). Indeed, four of the six Supreme Court
decisions in the Shaw I line of cases involved repeat attempts by the North
Carolina legislature to successfully defend the design of an intentionally
created majority-minority congressional district. See Easley, 532 U.S. 241-57;
Hunt, 526 U.S. at 545-54; Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 914-20; Shaw I, 509 U.S. 65758.
23. See generally Easley, 532 U.S. at 241-57 (giving several examples
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Often, nobody truly wins in redistricting litigation except for
the partners in the law firms that charge exorbitant hourly rates
to defend redistricting plans that have to be redrawn every few
years. ' Indeed, sometimes the civil rights claimants and their
respective attorneys-successful in their representation-obtain a
windfall in court ordered attorney's fees.25 Without a doubt, the
political campaigns of public officials, represented by attorneys
specializing in redistricting law, are likely to receive contributions
at any given time. From the beginning of the redistricting process
to the end of any litigation that ensues, and, of course, in
preparation of any future redistricting, the budgeting of public
expenditures with respect to any redistricting project may be
volatile.
Predictability in connection with the redistricting process in particular with the design of majority-minority districts - may
be more certain with meticulous planning and cooperation
between the politicians and attorneys involved, i.e., the "players,"
and can ensure more integrity and public confidence associated
with any redistricting project. In anticipating an equal-protection
racial-gerrymander challenge, perhaps the most valuable weapon
litigation details involving both parties that prolonged litigation); Hunt, 526
U.S. at 544-54 (giving the tedious and extended history surrounding North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District); Bush, 517 U.S. at 962 (citing direct
evidence of a district creating a majority-minority as "one of several
ingredients" to the Court's decision); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657-58 (remanding
the issue for further litigation); Shaw If, 517 U.S. at 901-914 (trying to get it
right the second time around in the Supreme Court); Barnett v. City of
Chicago (Barnett1), 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (expounding upon
the lengthy and tedious history of the trial); Barnett v. City of Chicago
(BarnettII), 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998) (continuing the litigation saga and
holding that citizen voting-age population was proper basis for determining
whether distribution of effective majority status was proportional to
population and remanding for district court to apply this standard in
reconsidering ruling); Barnett III, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (after remand from
Barnett II, holding that alternative maps proposed by African-American voters
created wards that met the appropriate proportional population standards determined by Barnett II, and this better balanced the relevant factors than
did the existing map). Indeed, redistricting litigation can prove to be a very
lucrative industry for law firms that are chosen to defend a redistricting plan.
See Steven R. Strahler, Random Walk: An Opportunity Missed by Jenner &
Block, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS, March 24, 1997, at 2 (noting that by 1997,
the Chicago-based national law firm Jenner & Block earned in excess of $7.5
million dollars in connection with legal work performed in defending the City
of Chicago in the Barnett litigation that commenced in 1992).
24. See Strahler, supra note 23 (giving details of Jenner & Block's
exorbitant fee award for defending the City of Chicago's redistricting plan).
25. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago (Barnett V), 122 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Ill. 2000), affd, 3 Fed. Appx. 546 (7th Cir. 2001) (awarding over 5
million dollars in plaintiffs attorney's fees for legal work performed in
connection with successful challenge to the City of Chicago's 1992 redistricting
plan).
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of the players who seek to design an unassailable majorityminority district is an understanding of the standard used for
equal-protection racial-gerrymander challenges, as well as the
burden-shifting scheme extracted from the Shaw I line of cases
and the Promethean value of the transcript containing testimony
of the legislative decision-makers adduced during the legislative
hearings for the proposed redistricting plan, i.e., the legislative
findings. 6
Indeed, in the context of equal-protection racialgerrymander challenges to majority-minority districts, legislative
findings, including the testimony of the public officials who seek to
testify in support of the design of the boundaries of majorityminority districts and the acknowledgment of participation by
attorneys and experts in the design of a redistricting plan that
support a majority-minority district, can act as both a sword and a
shield in the hands of the architects of majority-minority districts
when called upon to defend against an equal-protection racialgerrymander challenge.27
The notion of deferring to legislative findings that support the
proffered reasons for the design of one or more majority-minority
districts, as the primary evidence to justify the deliberate use of
race or ethnicity as a factor in the design of such a district has
been acknowledged, even if only implicitly, by the Supreme Court
in two of its six Shaw I cases.28 Moreover, in Chen v. City of
Houston ("Chen II"), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit relied almost exclusively on the testimony of the
proponents of the challenged districts adduced from the Houston
City Council hearings held prior to the adoption of Houston's 1997
redistricting plan to affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Houston's redistricting plan.' In Chen II, the
fifth circuit concluded that there was no need to apply strict
scrutiny to the challenged plan because, viewed inter alia, the
transcripts from three days of public hearings reflected that the

26. See also infra Part IV.
27. See Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 51.
28. See Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 517 (showing plan supporters having been
"heavily coached" which negated a presumption of legislative good faith). Cf
Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547-552 (refusing to find that race was the district's
motivating factor even though the Court acknowledged the strong correlation
between African Americans and the Democratic party with the contested
district); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916-20 (stating that districts are always aware of
racial demographics but that does not support the notion that race is a
predominant factor in the redistricting process). To qualify as a predominant
factor a district's racial motivation must be "obvious" and clear as an
"overriding desire" to assign district boundaries with racial distinctions.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 917.
29. See id. (citing the voluminous legislative testimony that the plaintiffs
argued created a material issue of fact regarding the legislature's racial

motivation in its districting structure).
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legislative decision makers did not predominately rely on race in
the design of Houston's 1997 redistricting plan.
This article proposes an iron-clad redistricting strategy that
redistricting entities can use to successfully defend against equalprotection racial-gerrymander claims directed at majority-minority
districts. This strategy is largely based on the City of Houston's
1997 successful redistricting efforts, which were affirmed by the
fifth circuit in Chen I. The City of Houston's strategy may be
viewed as a prototype, which, if followed, may obviate the need to
justify a majority-minority district under strict scrutiny because it
is unlikely the plaintiff will ever be able to satisfy its burden under
the predominant factor test.
Part II.A provides an overview of Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA,
and the requirements they impose on redistricting entities, i.e.,
the basis for Section 2 and Section 5 affirmative defenses. Part
II.B provides a summary of the Court's equal protection standard
that state and local entities must meet to justify race and/or
ethnic-based affirmative-action remedial programs under strict
scrutiny, i.e., the basis for remedial affirmative defenses. Part
II.C traces the Court's development of an analytic framework for
adjudicating equal-protection racial-gerrymander challenges to
majority-minority districts: from the Court's inception of its
standard in Shaw I to a more complete analytical framework
resulting in the Court's most recent decision in 2001 in Easley v.
Cromartie. Part II.D summarizes the analytical framework that,
as a result of the Shaw I line of cases, lower courts must use when
adjudicating equal-protection racial-gerrymander challenges to
majority-minority districts. Part IV discusses the redistricting
strategy employed by the City of Houston in 1997, which was
Finally, Part V proposes a strategy for
affirmed in Chen I.
anticipating equal-protection racial-gerrymander claims - based
on the strategy employed by the City of Houston in designing its
1997 Councilmanic plan - for redistricting entities to follow when
designing majority-minority districts that will, as in the Chen
litigation, be successfully defended in court - every time.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE
THE DILEMMA RAISED BY SHAW I AND ITS PROGENY
The Shaw I line of cases reflects the Court's attempt to create
a standard for adjudicating equal-protection racial-gerrymander
cases.
Rectifying these cases exemplifies the reality that
redistricting entities may intentionally rely on racial and/or ethnic
considerations when designing majority-minority districts that
comply with Section 2 and/or 5 of the VRA, and/or to remedy the
disabling effects of prior or present intentional discrimination
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against racial or ethnic minority group's voting strength."
Shaw I and its progeny have attempted to resolve the
apparent dilemma in redistricting entities being required by the
predominant factor test to prohibit consideration of race and/or
ethnicity in the design of electoral districts, while at the same time
having to rely on race and/or ethnicity as a factor in their design to
comply with Section 2 and 5 of the VRA. To remedy this, the
Court has suggested three affirmative defenses to the
predominant factor test which, in theory, may be used by a
redistricting entity to satisfy strict scrutiny.3
Two of the
affirmative defenses are based on designing majority-minority
districts that comply with the VRA, but all three affirmative
defenses may satisfy a redistricting entity's burden of proof under
strict scrutiny.
One affirmative defense created by the Court in the Shaw I
line of cases is based on designing a majority-minority district that
complies with Section 2 of the VRA.3 2 Under this Section 2
affirmative defense, if a redistricting entity can prove that a
challenged majority-minority district is narrowly tailored to
achieve compliance with Section 2, then, even assuming arguendo
that race or ethnicity is the predominant factor relied on in the
challenged district's design, the district is nevertheless valid and
constitutional.33
A second affirmative defense is based on
designing electoral districts that comply with Section 5 of the
VRA."
Similar to the Section 2 affirmative defense, if a
redistricting entity can prove that an electoral district is narrowly
tailored to achieve compliance with Section 5, then, even assuming
arguendo that race or ethnicity was the predominant factor relied
on in the design of the challenged district, the district is
nevertheless valid and constitutional." In addition to the Section
30. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 967-70 (affirming political gerrymandering as
contrasted with racial gerrymandering regardless of whether or not political
motivations correlate to racial classifications); see also Guinn, Chapman &
Knechtel, supra note 5, at 232-50 (laying out the evolution of the Shaw line of
cases and how race considerations play a role with judicial analysis).
31. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 959 (defending reapportionment with the goal of
creating a majority-minority district that satisfies Section 2 and incumbency
protection); Shaw H, 517 U.S. at 911 (defending redistricting by complying
with Section 2 and 5 requirements); Miller, 515 U.S. at 910-11 (misconstruing
an affirmative defense option because voter classification based solely on race
will call for strict scrutiny judicial review).
32. Bush, 517 U.S. at 978-79.
33. Id. at 979.
34. Shaw H, 517 U.S. at 911-13.
35. Bush, 517 U.S. at 982-83, 979. In the event that Section 5 is not
renewed before its current expiration date of June 29, 2007, redistricting
entities will have one less affirmative defense available if a court determines
that race or ethnicity is the predominant factor in the design of a majorityminority district. On June 29, 1982, Section 5 was Amended. Pub. L. No. 97-
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2 and Section 5 affirmative defenses, a third affirmative defense
exists, which is the same defense the Court created for
government entities to justify race-based affirmative-action,
remedial set-aside programs under strict scrutiny, or "the
remedial affirmative defense"." Under this defense, if a majorityminority district is narrowly tailored to eradicate the disabling
effects of past or present race or ethnic discrimination by the
redistricting entity, then, even assuming arguendo that race or
ethnicity is the predominant factor relied on in the majorityminority district's design, the district is nevertheless valid and
constitutional.
Significantly, none of the challenged districts in the Court's
Shaw I line of cases satisfied strict scrutiny under the Section 2
affirmative defense, the Section 5 affirmative defense, or the
remedial affirmative defense.'
As such, the Court has not set
forth concrete precedent for redistricting entities or lower courts to
follow as a model for what to do to ensure that a majority-minority
district satisfies strict scrutiny. In other words, the Court has
indicated what not to do.
Moreover, the Court has merely
indicated that, in theory, there is a way to satisfy strict scrutiny.
A summary of the standards imposed by Sections 2 and 5 of
the VRA provides a necessary foundation for understanding both
how a redistricting entity's use of race and/or ethnicity might be
required to satisfy those sections of the VRA and the
constitutional/statutory conflict the Court was confronted with
when it decided the Shaw I line of cases. Similarly, a summary of
the equal protection standard that the Court has developed for
state and local entities to justify race and/or ethnic based
affirmative-action governmental remedial programs in education

205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)-(b)

(2000)). Even though no substantive changes were made to the substantive
language supporting the "non-retrogressive" principle upon which the Section

5 affirmative defense is predicated, the clear and unambiguous language of
the amendment to Section 5 clearly indicates that, unless renewed, Section 5
is scheduled to expire twenty-five years following the date of the 1982
Amendment. Id. The amendment to Section 5 unequivocally states that "[tihe
provisions of this Section shall expire after twenty-five years following the

effective date of the Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1982." Id. If this
occurs, then as of June 29, 2007, there will be one less weapon in the already
limited arsenal of architects of majority-minority districts and litigators called
upon to defend such districts against equal protection racial gerrymander
challenges. Compare id., with Bush, 517 U.S. at 979-85, Shaw H, 517 U.S. at
909-16, Miller, 515 U.S. at 914-20, and Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657-59.
36. Id. at 982; Shaw H, 517 U.S. at 909-10.
37. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 982-83 (defining remedial action as equivalent to
an affirmative action program); Miller, 515 U.S. at 922-23 (requiring a strong
basis of evidence that remedial action is required as a race-based remedy).
38. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 985-986; Shaw H, 517 U.S. at 918; Miller, 515

U.S. at 917-918.
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and contracting under strict scrutiny provides a necessary
foundation for understanding the basis for the remedial
affirmative defense. These summaries will provide a foundation
for an examination of the Supreme Court's development of an
analytical framework for applying strict scrutiny in the Shaw I
line of cases.
A. Sections 2 and 5
The VRA was enacted to eradicate inequalities in the voting
strength of certain racial and ethnic minority groups that exist as
a result of the effects of past discrimination against those groups."
The two primary enforcement provisions of the VRA - often
resulting in litigation - are Sections 2 and 4O Sections 2 and 5
each impose separate independent VRA standards.41 The following
is a summary of the standards imposed by Sections 2 and 5 as well
as a discussion of how those sections are generally used in
litigation as redistricting enforcement mechanisms.42
1.

Section 2

Section 2 prohibits the vote dilution of protected minority
groups.' In particular, Section 2 proscribes states and their
political subdivisions from imposing any "voting qualifications or
prerequisites to voting or [any] standard, practice, or procedure
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote" who is a member of a protected class
of racial or language minorities under the Act." Section 2 provides
39. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The VRA does not
protect all racial or ethnic minority groups. Id. Covered groups under the
VRA include African Americans, Latinos, American Indians, Asian-Americans
and Alaskan Natives. See Polish Am. Cong. v. City of Chicago, 211 F. Supp.

2d 1098, 1107 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that citizens of Polish ancestry are not
within the class of "language minority" groups protected under VRA).
40. See Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra, note 5, at 699.

41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
42. Although the Court has developed a body of case law for its

interpretation of Sections 2 and 5, the thrust of this article is the way in which
the Court has developed an analytic framework within its equal protection
jurisprudence for adjudicating racial gerrymandering claims that incorporate

the VRA standard for compliance with Sections 2 and 5, and how redistricting

entities can design majority-minority districts that are successfully defended
in litigation based on equal-protection racial-gerrymander claims. For a
complete discussion of the Court's equal protection and VRA jurisprudence
relative to redistricting, see generally The Future of Majority-Minority
Districts, supra note 8, at 2208; Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra note 5, at

699.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).

Vote dilution includes voting practices that

.minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness of
minority groups." Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 479 (1997)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 (1983)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
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an independent cause of action for members of protected groups
who have been the victims of racial or ethnic discrimination in the
form of a dilution in the power of their group's collective vote. 45
Unlike an equal-protection racial-gerrymander challenge to
an electoral district, a Section 2 challenge to an electoral district
does not require proof, or inference of discriminatory intent by the
redistricting entity that designed the challenged electoral
districts."
Since the Court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles, the most common use of Section 2 has been to challenge
multimember, "at large" redistricting plans on a theory of minority
"vote dilution."47 Under the "Gingles factors" test, a plaintiff
attempting to establish a Section 2 vote dilution claim has the
burden of proving, as its prima facie case, that: (1) the minority
group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district;" (2) that the
minority group is "politically cohesive;" and (3) that the "white
majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable it to - in the
absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate
running
unopposed.., defeat
the
minority's
preferred
candidate."' If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the
Gingles factors test, then the burden of proof shifts to the
redistricting entity which can avoid liability under Section 2 by
showing that the "totality of the circumstances" reveal that the
"political processes leading to nomination or election ... are not
equally open to participation by members of a [protected
class] ... in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice."49
2.

Section 5

Section 5, unlike Section 2, does not have nationwide reach.0
Section 5 does not apply to all redistricting entities; Section 5
applies only to certain enumerated, or "covered" jurisdictions. 5 It

45. Id.
46. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986) (requiring only the
question of whether plaintiffs have an equal opportunity to vote).
47. Id. at 47-48; see, e.g., Barnett H, 141 F.3d 699.
48. Thornburg,478 U.S. at 50-51.
49. Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); 42

U.S.C. § 1973(b)(F).
50. See Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra note 5, at 243 (limiting Section
5 to "certain voting jurisdictions" that require preclearence by the Justice
Department before making any changes to the voting process).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). "Covered jurisdiction is used to refer to a State,

where the determination referred to in § 51.4 has been made on a statewide
basis, and to a political subdivision, where the determination has not been

made on a statewide basis." Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.2 (2006); See also id. at § 51.4
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requires covered jurisdictions that "enact or seek to administer
any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" to "preclear" the
proposed change with the Justice Department in order for the
change to result in a valid and enforceable statute."
This
extraordinary practice of "preclearance" requires all laws relating
to voting procedures in "covered" jurisdictions to be federally
reviewed by either the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department, or the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.n As a result, covered jurisdictions under Section 5 have
the option of either submitting redistricting plans to the Justice
Department or filing a complaint for declaratory judgment with
the District of Columbia for approval, i.e. preclearance.'
Since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Beer v. United
States,' the standard by which voting changes are reviewed and
precleared under Section 5 is whether retrogression would result
from the proposed voting change.'
To obtain preclearance, a
change in voting related practices must at least maintain the
minority voting position as of the benchmark date. Thus, under
Section 5, any change in voting related practices in a covered
jurisdiction that results in retrogression is not an effective,
enforceable law.m
B. An Overview of the Equal Protection StandardState and Local
Governmental Entities Must Meet to Justify Race-and/or
Ethnic-BasedRemedial Affirmative-Action Programs
Beginning in 1978 with the Court's seminal decision in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,59 and continuing
through the Court's 2003 decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger" and
Gratz v. Bollinger,' the Court has developed a jurisprudence for
race- and/or ethnic-based government-sponsored
remedial

appendix (providing details for determining what jurisdictions are covered).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
56. Id. at 141.
57. See id. at 151-53, 153 n.11 (declaring that the VRA is meant to prevent
retrogression and that the purpose of a proposed redistricting plan might be
gleaned from considering "a minority's relative position under the existing and
proposed plans").

58. Id. at 133.
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (reviewing an affirmative action program at a
public university).
60. See 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (reviewing race based admission standards at
the University of Michigan's Law School).
61. See 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (reviewing race based admission standards at

the University of Michigan's undergraduate school).
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programs." The Court's race- and ethnic-based affirmative-action
jurisprudence has developed a formula for determining whether a
government entity seeking to justify its intentional use of race
and/or ethnicity in its attempts to remedy the disabling effects of
past or present discrimination can satisfy its burden of proof under
both prongs of strict scrutiny: the compelling interest prong and
To determine whether a
the narrowly tailored prong.'
government entity sponsoring a remedial program can establish a
compelling interest, the Court has indicated that the government
entity must come forward with a factual predicate demonstrating
a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary."'
Generally, this means that the government
entity sponsoring the remedial program has to demonstrate either by evidentiary proof or via judicial, administrative, or
legislative findings - that it has engaged in past or present ethnic
and/or racial discrimination, and that there are identifiable

62. See generally John Valery White, From Brown to Grutter:Affirmative
Action and Higher Education in the South, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117, 2127-62
(June 2004). In all, the Court has decided eight cases involving appeals in
challenges to government-sponsored ethnic and/or race-based affirmativeGratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand
action programs.
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed.
Commc'n Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 276 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; see also
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (reviewing court ordered
race-based affirmative-action program as a remedy for racial discrimination by
a government employer).
From those decisions, there are at least two
compelling interests that, according to the Court, justify a governmentsponsored ethnic and/or race-based affirmative-action program under strict
scrutiny. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (finding a diverse student body to
be a compelling state interest), with J.A- Croson, 488 U.S. at 536-38 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (noting that the elimination of private discrimination is a
compelling interest, but attempting to remedy past discrimination is not).
The remedial affirmative-action defense recognized in the Shaw I line of
cases is based on the Court's recognition of a compelling interest in remedying
the disabling effects of prior and/or present ethnic and/or racial discrimination
by the government entity sponsoring the remedial program. Compare Shaw
11, 517 U.S. at 909-10 (asserting that past discrimination is not an adequate
defense because the scope is too broad to give the court any direction for
analyzing the proposed remedy for the injury), with J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at
509 (suggesting that direct evidence of discriminatory incidents may qualify as
a defense necessary to justify present conduct). None of the Court's decisions
in either its Shaw I line of cases, or within its affirmative-action jurisprudence
have held that a remedial program satisfies strict scrutiny. See Shaw 11, 517
U.S. at 909-10 (alleviating "the effects of societal discrimination is not a
compelling interest"). Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at
508-10.
63. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236.
64. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 539 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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"disabling effects" with a nexus to the prior or present
discrimination itself.n
Assuming arguendo that a court determines that the factual
predicate is sufficient to support a compelling interest in a
remedial program, the government entity must then demonstrate
that the remedial program is narrowly tailored to eradicate the
disabling effects of past and/or present ethnic and/or racial
discrimination by the government entity.' To satisfy the narrowly
tailored prong of strict scrutiny, the government entity must
establish that the remedial program is neither impermissibly
overinclusive, nor impermissibly underinclusive, i.e., the remedial
program can neither offer benefits to members of ethnic and/or
racial minority groups that the factual predicate does not reflect
discrimination against (overinclusive), nor can the benefits offered
by the remedial program be tailored to benefit only members of the
group that the factual predicate reflects have suffered actual
discrimination by the government entity sponsoring the program
(underinclusive).67
In addition, for the government approved remedial program
to be narrowly tailored under the Court's decisions in Bakke and
its progeny, the government entity sponsoring the remedial
program must first show that, prior to its adoption of the remedial
program, it attempted race- and/or ethnic-neutral means of
remedying the disabling effects identified by the factual
predicate.' Second, the impact of the remedial program must not
be unduly burdensome on third parties.69 Third, the duration of
the relief must be directly tied to eradicating the disabling effects
identified by the factual predicate.7 0 The remedial program must
also be flexible so as to achieve all of the elements of the narrowly
tailored prong of strict scrutiny.'
65. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (noting that race based action taken to
remedy "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" is
justified when the program is narrowly tailored to address the discriminatory
conduct); Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (suggesting that evidence of a pattern of
discrimination, supported by statistics, can aid in a remedial defense);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (proposing that an employer must have convincing
evidence that remedial action is necessary before embarking on an affirmative
action program).
66. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
67. See id. at 236-37 (discussing the importance to society of ensuring that
a close nexus exists between a remedial program and the discrimination
allegedly addressed by the program); Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (noting that
overinclusive programs serve to indicate that the underlying purpose of an
alleged remedial program "is not in fact to remedy past discrimination").
68. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 237.
69. Grutter,539 U.S. at 341.
70. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238.
71. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 488 (emphasizing the flexibility of the program
in Fullilove). For an example of a court ordered remedial program in an
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C. The Development of an Analytic Framework for Racial
GerrymanderingClaims: Shaw I and its Progeny
Beginning with its 1993 decision in Shaw I, the Supreme
Court has decided six cases recognizing an equal protection
standard "analytically distinct"72 from the standard utilized by the
Court in its review of equal protection challenges to redistricting
plans in prior cases.73 An examination of the Court's decisions in
Shaw I, Miller, Shaw H, Bush, Hunt, and Easley reveals the
evolution of the equal-protection racial-gerrymandering claim from
the Court's initial recognition of such a claim in Shaw I, to the
Court's most recent declaration on the subject in Easley.74 These
cases, when viewed together, also reveal the Court's incorporation
within its analytical framework for equal-protection racialgerrymander claims of affirmative defenses which may be raised
by redistricting entities relying on race or ethnicity in the creation
of an electoral district in order to comply with Sections 2 and/or 5.
1. Shaw I: The Court's Recognition of an Equal ProtectionRacial
GerrymanderingClaim
In Shaw I, a group of North Carolina voters challenged the
state legislature's use of race in the creation of two congressional
districts: District 1 and District 12." Like the equal protection
claims in the five cases that followed, the plaintiffs in Shaw I were
white voters who claimed that the legislature's decision to split
employment context that satisfies both prongs of strict scrutiny, see Paradise,
480 U.S. at 169-74.
72. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911.
73. Id. In point of fact, prior to Shaw I, the Court only considered and
decided one case involving an equal protection racial gerrymander challenge to
an electoral district. See United Jewish Org. 430 U.S. at 148-49. The
analytical framework and the standard for adjudicating equal protection racial
gerrymander cases set forth by the Shaw I line of cases effectively overruled
the standard set forth by the Court's plurality decision in United Jewish Org.
Compare Shaw 1I, 517 U.S. at 909-14, and Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12, with
United Jewish Org., 430 U.S. at 148-49; see also Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel,
supra note 5, at 227-28 (discussing the Court's recent attempts to rectify the
conflicting standards).
74. In addition to the Court's six decisions in the Shaw I line of cases
tracing the development of the Court's framework for examining racial
gerrymandering claims, the Court in 1995 summarily affirmed a case, without
a written opinion, wherein a district court panel approved a redistricting plan.
DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily aff/d and
dismissed in part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995). There is, however, no reasoning from
the Court in Dewitt's from which redistricting entities may find guidance. See
Bush, 517 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("[Olur summary affirmance in
DeWitt stands for no proposition other than the districts reviewed were
constitutional. We do not endorse the reasoning of the district court when we
order summary affirmance of judgment."); see also id. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J.
concurring) (agreeing with Justice Kennedy).
75. 509 U.S. at 633.
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their community into two districts was based solely on racial
considerations - the intent to create a majority-minority district."
However, unlike prior cases before the Court, the allegations in
the complaint supporting the plaintiffs' equal protection claim in
Shaw I focused on the "bizarre" shape of the challenged districts."
The complaint alleged that the extremely irregular shape of the
districts alone was indicative of "an effort to segregate the races
for the purpose of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification." 8
According to the allegations in the complaint, district I was "hookshaped" with "finger-like extensions," which the North Carolina
district court compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test."79 District 12
was even more bizarrely shaped. ° The complaint also alleged that
District 12 was approximately 160 miles long and ran on both
sides of an interstate highway, "[iut [wound] in snakelike fashion
through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing
areas until it gobble[d] in enough enclaves of black
neighborhoods." 81
Although a three-judge district court panel granted the
State's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to
allege a claim upon which relief could be granted, the Court
reversed the district court's decision." The majority opinion was
authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas (collectively
"the Shaw I majority").'
The Shaw I majority focused on the
allegation of the bizarre shape of the challenged districts as an
apparent decisive factor, holding that "[in some exceptional cases,
a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its
face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to 'segregate... voters' on the basis of race."' In remanding
the case to the North Carolina district court, the Court in Shaw I
directed the district court to determine, assuming the allegations
76. Prior to Shaw I, an equal protection plaintiff alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination in redistricting had to show both a racially discriminatory
purpose and a discriminatory effect on the claimants' group. DeWitt, 856 F.
Supp. at 1413.
77. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 642.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 635.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 635-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 656-57. Prior to its decision in Shaw I, the only appeal to the
Court from the adjudication by a lower court of an equal protection racial
gerrymander claim was in United Jewish Org., 430 U.S. at 148-49.
83. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658. In reversing, the Court recognized that the

issue presented was "analytically distinct" from issues presented in the
Court's prior decisions involving alleged equal protection violations to alleged
unconstitutional race-based gerrymandering. Id. at 652.
84. Id. at 646-647.
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of racial gerrymandering were uncontradicted by the State,
whether the congressional reapportionment plan containing
Districts 1 and 12 satisfied strict scrutiny. 85
The Court in Shaw I also went on to conclude that even
assuming that the plaintiffs were able to satisfy their burden of
proving race was the predominant factor in the design of Districts
1 and 12, there were at least two compelling government interests
that would, under strict scrutiny, justify predominant reliance on
race in the design of a majority-minority district: (1) eradicating
the effects of present or past discrimination; and (2) compliance
with Section 5.8 In so doing, the Shaw I majority stated that if a
reapportionment plan is narrowly tailored to achieve either of
these objectives, the plan would survive strict scrutiny.
Significant to subsequent decisions, the Court in Shaw I did not
comment on the significance, if any, of the procedural posture of
the order appealed from, i.e. the ruling on a motion to dismiss the
complaint.88
2. The Pronouncementof the "PredominantFactor"Test: Miller v.
Johnson
In the Court's 1995 decision in Miller, the Court's
pronouncement of the "predominant factor" test emphasized that
legislative purpose is more important than shape in proving an
equal-protection racial-gerrymander claim, and that purpose
ultimately determines whether strict scrutiny is triggered.8 In
Miller, five Georgia voters challenged Georgia's Congressional
District 11, a majority-minority district intentionally created in
order for Georgia's congressional reapportionment plan to obtain
0
Even
preclearance by the Justice Department under Section 5."
though the shape of District 11 was not altogether bizarre in
comparison with other districts, Georgia conceded that racial
considerations were its primary motivation for the creation of
District 11.9'
2
A three-judge district court panel invalidated District 11.9
The district court concluded that the State failed to carry its
burden of justifying the plan containing District 11 under strict
scrutiny. 3 In so doing, the district court "read Shaw [I] to require

85. Id. at 658.
86. Id. at 657.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 637.
89. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 909-910.
Id.
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strict scrutiny whenever race is the overriding, predominant force
in the redistricting process."94
The Court in Miller, in an opinion via the Shaw I majority
authored by Justice Kennedy, affirmed the Georgia district court
decision.95 After noting that there is a "presumption of good faith
that must be accorded legislative enactments, [which] requires
courts to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims
that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of race," the
Court in Miller interpreted its holding in Shaw I to mean that a
district's bizarre shape is merely circumstantial evidence that race
was the primary consideration in redistricting.' In so doing, the
Court stated that a claimant in a racial gerrymandering case is
"neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district's
geometry and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing
of bizarreness."97
Significantly, the Court in Miller for the first time pronounced
the predominant factor test as the test to be applied in equalprotection racial-gerrymander cases to determine whether a
claimant has satisfied its burden of proof which, to reiterate, is as
follows:
The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district. To make
this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles,
including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interest, to racial considerations. 9
Since the evidence before the district court in Miller
established that race was the predominant factor in the creation of
District 11, the Court concluded that the district court correctly
determined that an application of strict scrutiny was warranted.'
In reviewing whether District 11 satisfied strict scrutiny, the
Court did not squarely address whether compliance with Section 2
or 5 could be a compelling interest. 0 The Court did, however,
reject the State's contention that there is a compelling interest in
complying with the Justice Department's interpretation of the

94. Id. at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 903, 928.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 928.
See id. at 921.
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1°1
VRA.
In so doing, the Court stated that "blind judicial
deference" to the Justice Department's interpretation of the VRA
"has no place in equal protection analysis." 01 2
The Court in Miller also concluded that the drawing of
District 11 was not required to comply with Section 5's nonretrogression principle." In so doing, the Court reasoned that in
satisfying the Justice Department's objections to previous plans,
the Georgia legislature's clear purpose for creating District 11 was
to maximize the number of majority-minority congressional
districts, not to avoid retrogression.'
Since Georgia's earlier
congressional redistricting plans had already increased the
number of majority-minority districts, the Court in Miller
concluded that adding an additional majority-minority district was
not required in order to comply with Section 5.1°5

3. Shaw II and Bush: A More Complete Analytic Framework Set
Forth in Two Cases Decided the Same Day
On June 13, 1996, the Court issued its two opinions in Shaw
II and Bush."
In each of these cases, the Court applied the
predominant factor test and strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate
the redistricting plans challenged therein. Shaw II and Bush are
the only two cases wherein the Court has applied both the
predominant factor test and strict scrutiny analysis in assessing
the constitutional validity of a redistricting plan.0 7
a. Shaw I
After the remand in Shaw I, the North Carolina district court
determined that even though race was the predominant factor in
the creation of North Carolina's Districts 1 and 12, the districts
were constitutionally valid because the plan that created them
satisfied strict scrutiny, i.e., was narrowly tailored to achieve
compliance with Sections 2 and 5.1°8 In an opinion, again via the
Shaw I majority, this time authored by the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court reversed the district court decision." The
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 922.
Id. at 922 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501).
Id. at 923.
Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924 (declaring that Georgia's policy of "adhering to other

districting principles instead of creating as many majority-minority districts
as possible" is not evidence of discriminatory purpose).
106. Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 899; Bush, 517 U.S. at 952. Although Shaw II was
decided on the same day as Bush, the majority opinion in Shaw II appears in
both the United States Reporter and the Supreme Court Reporter before the
Court's plurality opinion in Bush.
107. Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 906-07; Bush, 517 U.S. at 959-60.
108. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
109. Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 901, 918.
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Court in Shaw II dismissed the challenge directed at District 1
because none of the claimants resided in District 1 and therefore
The Court's focus, in terms of its
did not have standing."'
application of Shaw I and Miller to further develop an analytic
framework relating to the substantive law of equal protection
racial gerrymander cases, was directed at the propriety of the
district court's decision relative to District 12.111 In so doing, the
Court in Shaw II applied the predominanit factor test and
concluded that strict scrutiny was warranted because the evidence
demonstrated that race was the predominant factor in drawing
District 12."'
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court in Shaw II identified three
compelling interests that could sustain a redistricting plan."' The
Court agreed with the State that eradicating the effects of past or
present discrimination is a compelling interest."" The Court also
assumed, without deciding, that achieving compliance with
Sections 2 and 5 are compelling interests which could independently -justify a majority-minority district designed with
race as the predominant factor."' With respect to whether the
creation of District 12 was justified by a compelling interest in
eradicating the effects of present or prior discrimination, the Court
in Shaw II concluded that there was insufficient proof of present
to support a finding that such a compelling
or prior discrimination
116

interest existed.

As in Miller, the Court in Shaw II also held that the design of
District 12 was not required by its independent reading of Section
5, which, in the Court's view, did not require a redistricting plan
that maximized the number of majority-minority districts." ' Since
North Carolina's earlier redistricting plans had already increased
the number of majority-minority districts in comparison to
previous plans, adding District 12 was not required to achieve
compliance with Section 5's non-retrogression principle."' Hence,
in the Court's view, the plan containing District 12 was not
required to comply with Section 5.11'
The Court then rejected the State's contention that District 12
was created in order to comply with Section 2.120 In so doing, the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 904.
Id. at 905-09.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 913.
Id.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Court applied the Gingles factors, 2' which set forth the three
essential preconditions for a cause of action under Section 2.122
These elements require a minority group challenging a multimember redistricting plan under Section 2 to demonstrate that: (1)
"it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district;" (2) "it is politically cohesive;"
and (3) "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
to - in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority
candidate running unopposed.., defeat the minority's preferred
candidate."23 The Court concluded that the first Gingles factor
was not satisfied, reasoning that, given the "snake-like"
appearance of District 12, "[n]o one looking at District 12 could
reasonably suggest that the district contains a 'geographically
compact' population of any race.' 24 As such, the Court concluded
that the District 12 plan did not achieve compliance with Section
2.125

b. Bush
In Bush, a panel of three district judges concluded that Texas
Congressional Districts 18, 29, and 30 were unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders. 126 The primary tool used in drawing congressional
district boundaries was a computer program that permitted the
Texas legislature to manipulate district lines on computer maps on
which racial and other socio-economic data was superimposed at
block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party
registration and past voting statistics, was available only at the
level of voter registration districts. Before 1990, that data had not
been broken down beyond the census tract level.'27 The Texas
district court determined that strict scrutiny was appropriate
because the districts "were all designed with highly irregular
boundaries that take no heed of traditional districting criteria."28
Applying strict scrutiny, the district court concluded that none of
the districts were "narrowly tailored to fulfill the State's
compelling interest in avoiding
liability under § 2 or § 5 of the
29
Federal Voting Rights Act."
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor and joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy, affirmed the district court's decision that

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Shaw H,517 U.S. at 914.
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
Shaw H,517 U.S. at 916.
Id. at 917.
Bush, 517 U.S. at 957.
Id. at 961-62.
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994).

Id.
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race was the predominant factor in the design of the challenged
districts and that the challenged districts did not satisfy strict
scrutiny.3
Even though the Court's plurality in Bush
characterized the case as a "mixed motive" case, 13 it held that the
record demonstrated that race was the predominant factor in the
creation of the challenged districts. 13' The Texas legislators in
Bush also conceded that racial considerations, i.e., the creation of a
majority-minority congressional district, were a significant driving
force behind the challenged districts."3 Indeed, the Court in Bush
observed that even though there was also extensive evidence that
the legislature was concerned with ensuring the re-election of
incumbent Congressmen, any "political gerrymandering was
accomplished in large part by the use of race as a proxy." 34 Hence,
the Court held that race was a predominant factor in the design of
the challenged electoral districts.
Significantly, the Court's plurality opinion in Bush identified
the same three compelling interests as the majority in Shaw II
35
that could sustain a redistricting plan under strict scrutiny.
With respect to eradicating the effects of present and past
discrimination and achieving compliance with Section 2, the State
argued that the creation of Districts 18, 19, and 20 was necessary
to prevent minority vote dilution as a consequence of racial bloc
voting.' Referencing the three Gingles factors, and the additional
caveat that "[a] district drawn in order to satisfy § 2 must not
subordinate traditional districting principles to race substantially
more than is 'reasonably necessary' to avoid § 2 liability," the
Court rejected the State's contention.'37 In the plurality's view,
none of the challenged districts were sufficiently geographically
compact to reflect that the State did not subordinate traditional
districting principles to race more than reasonably necessary to
avoid Section 2 liability.'
Hence, the challenged majorityminority districts did not realize the compelling interest of
achieving compliance with Section 2.
As for Section 5, the only contention relied on by the State
was that creation of District 18 was justified in achieving
compliance with Section 5.139 The Court's plurality in Bush
rejected this argument reasoning that District 18 was not created

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Bush, 517 U.S. at 957.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 977-984.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 979
Id.
Id. at 976.
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40
to maintain minority voting strength, but rather to augment it.'
The plurality stated that "[n]onretrogression is not a license for
the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued
electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's
opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished,
directly or indirectly, by the State's actions.""' Hence, the Court
concluded that the plan containing District 18 did not achieve
compliance with Section 5. As a result, the challenged majorityminority districts were invalidated.'

4. Hunt and Easley: Scaling Back on the PredominantFactor
Test
The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Hunt and its 2001
decision in Easley are the Court's latest decisions assessing the
propriety of an equal-protection racial-gerrymandering claim.'" In
both cases, the Court again reviewed the proof supporting a racialgerrymandering challenge to North Carolina's District 12, which
was redrawn following the Court's decision in Shaw H."' The
Court's theme in these two cases appears to be that the focus of
the predominant factor test is to determine legislative intent, and
that the district court's ability to examine a well-developed record
is essential to this determination.
a.

Hunt: North Carolina's District 12 - Round 3

In response to the Court's 1996 decision in Shaw II, North
Carolina enacted a new reapportionment plan altering District 12
in several respects."
Among other things, the new District 12
reduced the total minority population to approximately 47% of the
district. District 12 was also geographically different from the
previous District 12, splitting fewer counties and retaining only
41.6% of its former area.4 7 Although the new District 12 was
wider and shorter than the previous District 12, it retained its
"snake-like" shape and continued to track both sides of the
interstate1
The North Carolina district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the claimants before either the claimants or the State
140. Id. at 983.
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 541; Easley, 532 U.S. at 234.
145. See Hunt, 526 U.S. at 543 (reviewing the constitutionality of North
Carolina's 12th congressional district for the third time in six years); Easley,
532 U.S. at 234 (reviewing North Carolina's racial districting for the fourth
time).
146. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 544.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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had conducted discovery, and without an evidentiary hearing. 149
Although the State relied on an affidavit containing expert opinion
testimony stating that District 12 was created to produce a
Democratic seat in Congress, as well as "after the fact" affidavits
of two members of the North Carolina General Assembly stating
that the General Assembly attempted to adhere to traditional
districting principles, the district court panel concluded that "the
uncontroverted material facts" showed that District 12 was
designed "to collect precincts with high racial identification rather
than political identification." 5 ' From the so-called "uncontroverted
facts," including statistical and demographic evidence submitted
by the claimants, the district court panel concluded that the North
Carolina General Assembly relied on race as the predominant
factor in drawing of District 12 because, in the district court's
view, race, rather than politics explained the drawing of District
12.' 1
Hence, the district court applied strict scrutiny and
invalidated North Carolina District 12.
In a majority opinion, via the Shaw I majority and authored
by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court in Hunt reversed and
remanded the North Carolina district court's decision."' Noting
that there is a "presumption of good faith that must be accorded
legislative enactments" and that "[t]he task of assessing a
[redistricting entity's] motivation is not a simple matter," rather
"it is an inherently complex endeavor, one requiring the trial court
to perform a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available," the Court held that there
were triable issues that precluded summary judgment."' In so
doing, the Court observed that, even though "[v]iewed in toto,
appellees' evidence tends to support an inference that the State
drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive," and
that the affidavit submitted by the State's expert opined that race
corresponded closely with political affiliation, thus, precluding
summary judgment."
Since the evidence on the issue of intent
was in dispute, the Court concluded that the North Carolina
district court erred in determining that summary judgment in
favor of the claimants was proper.

149. Id. at 543.
150. Id. at 545.

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).

154. Id. at 548.
155. Id.
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b.

Easley: The Constitutionality of North Carolina's District 12
On remand from Hunt, the parties undertook additional
discovery, after which a three day trial was held.'56 Based on the
evidence presented at trial, the North Carolina district court in
Easley concluded that the North Carolina legislature had relied on
race as the predominant factor in drawing the new District 12.'
The district court based its conclusion on, inter alia, one critical
factual determination that race rather than politics (a
Democratic seat in Congress) predominantly explained the new
boundaries of District 12."' As a result, the court invalidated the
district.'59
The Supreme Court in Easley, in a majority opinion authored
by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, and Ginsberg, reversed the North Carolina district court
and upheld North Carolina's District 12.160 Interestingly, the
Court's independent examination of the district court record
reflected that the North Carolina legislature had drawn the
boundaries of District 12 to collect precincts with high racial
identification. 6' However, the Court also observed that, in the
case of District 12, "the voting population is one in which race and
political affiliation are highly correlated." 2 As such, the Court
concluded that "[gliven the undisputed evidence that racial
identification is highly correlated with political affiliation in North
Carolina, these facts in and of themselves cannot, as a matter of
law, support the District Court's judgment.""
Because the
evidence before the district court reflected that, as far as District
12 was concerned, race correlated with Democratic voting
behavior, the Court in Easley concluded that "political, not racial,
reasons" explained District 12." Thus, the Court held that the
plaintiff had not carried its burden of demonstrating that race was
the predominant factor in the district's design.
M

D. The Impact of Shaw I and its Progeny on the Equal-Protection
Standardfor Adjudicating Racial-GerrymanderingClaims.
At least three conclusions can be drawn from the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Shaw I line of cases. First, not all racial
considerations are proscribed when designing electoral districts
under a redistricting plan; as long as race is not the predominant
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Easley, 532 U.S. at 239.
Id. at 239-40.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238, 240.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 248.
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factor in the drawing of district boundaries, then strict scrutiny is
not triggered.165 If, however, traditional districting principles are
subordinated to race, then the redistricting entity must justify its
plan under strict scrutiny."
Hunt and Easley, however,
demonstrate that a practical problem arises when a redistricting
entity relies predominantly on an apparently race-neutral factor
that corresponds closely with race.'67 Since Easley is the only postShaw I decision that has addressed this situation, it is unclear
whether political preference is the only legitimate race neutral
factor, despite its close correlation with race, that may be relied on
by redistricting entities to avoid triggering strict scrutiny.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from Shaw I and its
progeny is that there are at least three compelling interests that
can justify a redistricting plan once strict scrutiny is triggered: (1)
eradicating the effects of present or past discrimination; (2)
achieving compliance with Section 2; and (3) achieving compliance
with Section 5." However, since the Court has only assumed,
without deciding, that these are sufficiently compelling interests
to support a plan, and because the Court has never held that a
redistricting plan has satisfied strict scrutiny, there is no model
Supreme Court decision for lower courts to follow as to exactly how
a redistricting plan can satisfy both the compelling interest prong
and the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny.
Future
Supreme Court decisions should provide more guidance to lower
courts and to redistricting entities in this respect.
The Court's decision in Easley presents a third and
independent conclusion that can be drawn from the Shaw I line of
cases. Unlike the decisions in Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, Bush, and
Hunt, the Court in Easley performed an independent, unilateral
examination of the trial court record to determine whether the
legislative design of the challenged district predominantly relied
on race.69 Indeed, the Court essentially functioned as a trial court
in its assessment of the constitutional validity of North Carolina's
District 12 .
The Court's function in this regard was unique
insofar as it was a departure from its usual function of
determining whether a lower court applied the correct legal
standard. 7' In this regard, the Court in Easley may have set a
165. See Guinn, Chapman & Knechtel, supra note 5, at 250 (highlighting the
practical problem created by the Court's pronouncement in Bush that race is
not always the predominant factor when creating majority-minority districts).
166. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
167. Easley, 532 U.S. at 244; Hunt, 526 U.S. at 544.
168. Bush, 517 U.S. at 976.
169. Easley, 532 U.S. at 246-49.
170. Id.
171. Compare id. (reviewing the facts in the record on file), with Shaw 1, 509
U.S. 630 (reviewing whether plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim), Miller,
515 U.S. 900 (questioning whether there was a valid equal protection claim
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precedent for its role in equal protection redistricting litigation.
III.

THE PROTOTYPE REDISTRICTING STRATEGY USED BY THE CITY OF

HOUSTON IN DESIGNING ITS 1997 COUNCILMANIC DISTRICTING PLAN
MAY BE USED BY OTHER REDISTRICTING ENTITIES TO DESIGN AND
PADLOCK MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS

As a result of the Court's attempt in the Shaw I line of cases
to resolve the potential conflict between its equal protection
standard for racial-gerrymandering challenges and Sections 2 and
5, redistricting entities are now forced to carefully design
redistricting plans so as to reduce exposure to possible liability
from a racial gerrymandering claim.17 ' This is especially so when a
plan resulting in one or more majority-minority district(s) is
bizarrely shaped and/or divides a racial or ethnic group into two or
more districts.'
However, an application of strict scrutiny... may
be avoided if, as in Easley, a court determines that the plaintiff
has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that race was
predominantly relied on in constructing the challenged district(s)
more so than traditional districting criteria.'
Thus, to a large
degree the focus of discovery and proof in racial-gerrymandering
cases is an attempt to discover the evidence reflecting the extent to
which race was intentionally relied on and/or subordinated to
traditional161districting principles in the design of the challenged
district(s).
With foreknowledge
of the
equal-protection
racialgerrymander standards from the Shaw I line of cases and an
examination of the relative exposure of any majority-minority
districts within the redistricting plan to an equal-protection racialgerrymandering lawsuit based on an application of those
standards, there is no excuse for designing electoral districts that
will subject the redistricting entity to a test of strict scrutiny
regarding a majority-minority district challenged in subsequent

and whether it would survive strict scrutiny), Shaw 11, 517 U.S. 901 (deciding

whether North Carolina's plan survives strict scrutiny), Bush, 517 U.S. 969
(addressing only the constitutional issue and standard of review), and Hunt,
526 U.S. 543 (reviewing whether the lower court's grant of summary judgment
was appropriate).

172. See Guinn, Chapman and Knechtel, supra note 5, at 227-28.
173. See id. at 230.
174. An application of strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal to redistricting
plan. See, e.g., King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(upholding intentionally designed Latino-majority district under strict
scrutiny as being narrowly tailored to achieve compliance with Section 2).
175. Easley, 532 U.S. at 241; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 (finding
statements by a government official to be powerful evidence of subordinating
traditional principles for racial considerations).
176. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547.
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litigation. 177 Attorneys for redistricting entities may advise the
politicians whose electoral districts are contained therein to
support the constitutional design of their respective districts with
their own testimony as to the non-racial factors relied on in the
design of their respective electoral districts. 7 ' The transcript
containing that testimony and any additional testimony of
computer experts, demographers, or anyone that participated in
the process then becomes a pre-litigation, and post-litigation
weapon designed to increase the likelihood that any prospective
challenge will be easily and efficiently disposed of - procedurally
and substantively. 79 The result in Chen II becomes a bargaining
tool in the hands of the politicians defending their district, and the
need for discovery in any litigation that ensues becomes minimal.
The fifth circuit's 2000 decision in Chen II affirmed a district
court decision concluding, based largely upon testimony adduced
at legislative hearings, that the City of Houston did not primarily
rely on race in connection with its 1997 redistricting plan. The
nature of the findings adduced in the legislative hearings - in
particular, the legislative testimony therein - relied on by the
City of Houston in anticipation of the lawsuit in Chen, as well as
the litigation strategy employed by the City of Houston to defend
the challenged districts in its 1997 redistricting plan, may prove to
be a prototype model for redistricting entities who seek an ironclad approach to designing a redistricting plan and defending it in
a subsequent equal-protection racial-gerrymandering challenge
based on the Shaw I line of cases. 80
A.

The Strategy Employed by the City of Houston in the Design of
its 1997 Municipal RedistrictingPlan
The Chen litigation involved an equal-protection racialgerrymandering claim to Houston's 1997 redistricting plan ("1997
Houston Plan"), and was set against the backdrop of Houston's
annexation in 1996 of a predominantly white suburban community
known as Kingwood with a population of over 40,000, along with
the annexation of three other areas with a combined population of
almost 5,000.1" As part of Houston's 1997 redistricting process,
177. Id. at 547-48.
178. Id.
179. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 517.

180. See Steve Bickerstaff, Effects of Voting Rights Act on Reapportionment
and Hispanic Voting Strength in Texas, 6 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 110
(2001) ("The process followed by the City of Houston is a model for use in

successfully negotiating the narrow path between drawing districts with a
consciousness of race and ethnicity necessary to assure compliance with the

Voting Rights Act and drawing districts unconstitutionally based on the race
or ethnicity of the inhabitants.").

181. Chen v. City of Houston (Chen I), 9 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
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members of the Houston City Council s2 had to decide in which of
Houston's nine districts (Districts A through I) the Kingwood
community should be placed, while at the same time complying
with the Supreme Court's equal protection and VRA standards."n
In so doing, Houston's City Council compiled an evidentiary record
of legislative hearings. The evidence contained in the transcript
from those legislative hearings was the primary evidence relied on
to support the City of Houston's court victory in the subsequent
racial gerrymandering challenge to the map.' An examination of
the factors at issue in the annexation of Kingwood and the three
less populated neighboring communities, and the concepts
discussed via lamb chop testimony during the 1997 City Council
hearings, may provide guidance as to the way in which
redistricting entities approach redistricting in the future.
1. The Annexation of Kingwood, and the Concomitant Effect on
the Racial Balance in Houston's CouncilmanicDistricts
After the annexation of Kingwood, the City of Houston had to
determine in which district to place Kingwood while allocating the
spillover effect in other districts so as to avoid disrupting
population balances in those districts."5 Kingwood was adjacent
to two Houston City Council districts - each composed of a
different racial majority; (1) District B, a predominately AfricanAmerican community, and (2) District E, a predominantly white
community." The population adjustments to District E, as well as
the other Houston City Council districts were accomplished by
using a computer software program that contained racial and
ethnic data at the level of the voting precincts."' The resulting
approved map, as measured by total population figures, contained

182. The City of Houston's districting scheme, as it relates to electing City
Council members in single-member districts, is somewhat similar to many
state and local districting schemes. The City of Houston is governed by a
fifteen member City Council consisting of: (i) the mayor and five council
members, who, like Houston's mayor, are elected at-large; and (ii) nine council
members elected through single member districts (Districts A through I).
Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 504.
183. Id. at 510-14.
184. Id. at 515.
185. Id. at 514-15.
186. Id. at 508-09.
187. Id. at 508. Advances in technology and, in particular, the availability of
computer software program containing census data and district boundaries,
along with the concurrent ability to place and replace electoral district
boundaries has made the ability to design redistricting plans and the
individual electoral districts therein into an efficient and convenient way to
facilitate the redistricting process and any subsequent litigation stemming

there from. Bush, 517 U.S. at 962.
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two districts with a Hispanic majority and two districts with an
African-American majority.'88
2.

The Houston City Council Hearings and the Section 5 Filings

Prior to the City of Houston's adoption of the 1997 Houston
Plan, the Houston City Council held three days of legislative
hearings wherein members of the City Council supporting and
opposing the annexation of Kingwood into District E gave
testimony as to the reasons for their respective positions. 89 In
addition, the City of Houston, a covered jurisdiction within the
meaning of Section 5, filed documents with the Justice
Department to obtain preclearance.'
Both the hearings and the
Section 5 filings were relied on by the City of Houston in the Chen
litigation as evidence of the factors relied on by the City Council in
adopting its 1997 plan.'
The Houston City Council hearings
relating to the 1997 Houston Plan, focused primarily on: (1) a
comparison between Kingwood's community of interest, and
District E's and District B's communities of interest; and (2) the
spillover concerns, in terms of population balance, in an attempt to
minimize one-person, one-vote
concerns and the mass redrawing of
2
other district borders.9
a.

Testimony by Proponents of the 1997 Houston Plan

Proponents of the 1997 Houston Plan testified that
Kingwood's communities of interest were consistent with District
E, but were at variance with District B.'
In so doing, Houston
City Council members supporting the 1997 Houston Plan did not
limit their testimony to general discussions of socio-economic
indicators.'
In particular, City Council members supporting the
annexation of Kingwood to District E referred to both anecdotal
188. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 504-05.
189. Id. at 517.
190. Id. at 504.
191. Id. at 515-16.
In July 1997, the 1997 Houston Plan received
Department of Justice preclearance pursuant to Section 5. Chen I, 9 F. Supp.
2d at 747.
192. Chen 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 757-758 ; see also Transcript of Houston City
Council Hearing at 7-10, (Feb. 26, 1997). In addition to focusing on the extent
to which the placement of Kingwood in District E preserved existing
communities of interest and are-perforce-vote concerns, there was also
extensive testimony at the Houston City Council's hearings demonstrating
that the City of Houston's decision to place Kingwood in District E was
partially driven by the fear of retrogression liability in derogation of Section 5.
Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 614-15; see also Transcript of Houston City Council
Hearing at 51-54, (Feb. 26, 1997); Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing
at 7-10 (Apr. 2, 1997).
193. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 515-16. See also Transcript of Houston City
Council Hearing at 21-30, 48-49, (Feb. 26, 1997).
194. See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
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and statistical evidence demonstrating that the average income
and quality of housing in Kingwood were much higher than those
of District B, while the percentage of individuals on public relief
and the occurrence of illiteracy were much lower.9 Proponents of
the 1997 Houston Plan also testified as to infrastructure
differences in District B, and referred to it as the "worst in the
city." The infrastructure and average income of District E was
closer to that of Kingwood.'
Like Kingwood, District E also
contained planned communities that shared Kingwood's concerns
relative to services and taxation.'9 7
Proponents of the 1997 Houston Plan also emphasized that
given Kingwood's large population, placing Kingwood in District B
would have a population spillover effect which would negatively
effect the majority-minority population balance in other districts
- more so than placing Kingwood in District E.9 8 At that time,
District B was close to the one-person, one-vote limit and placing
Kingwood in District B would cause a ripple effect, moving
predominantly African-American areas on the borders of District B
into surrounding districts creating an additional spillover effect of
requiring several districts to be redrawn to eliminate the then
existing majority-minority population in these Districts.' Placing
the African-American populations on the borders of District B into
adjacent districts would have eliminated the Hispanic majority in
the adjacent districts.
Placing Kingwood into District E, instead
of into District B, minimized population spillover concerns and
prevented mass redrawing of other districts borders that would
have ensued.2 °'
b. Testimony Relating to the Avoidance/Prevention of
Retrogression
Testimony in support of the 1997 Houston Plan also showed
that the Houston City Council carefully considered the proposed
plan and the feasibility of various modifications, and that the
decision to place Kingwood in District E was partially driven by
the fear of retrogression liability in derogation of Section 5 .

195. Chen I1, 206 F.3d at 515-16.
196. Id. at 515.
197. Id. at 516.
198. Id. at 515-16.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 514 (noting that the 1997 Plan largely maintained the borders
of previous plans, set with the goal of creating two black and two Hispanic

single member districts).
201. Id. at 514-15.
202. Id. at 514.
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Testimony by Opponents of the 1997 Houston Plan

Even though the majority of Houston City Council members
supported the 1997 Houston Plan, there were opponents who
provided opening statements and comments during the City
Council debates and before the final council vote. 3 However, at
no point did the opponents of the 1997 Houston Plan challenge the
other Council members' statements characterizing Kingwood's
socio-economic status, infrastructure, or "available public
services." °4 Indeed, the opponents of the 1997 Houston Plan never
attempted to show - either by their own testimony at the
hearings or through expert testimony - that the lack of similarity
between Kingwood and District B was overcome by the presence of
commonalities of communities of interest.2 5
The closest the
opponents came to challenging testimony relating to reliance on
the similarities between Kingwood's communities of interest and
that of District E, was a disclosure by a member of the Houston
City Council who opposed the plan. That member stated, in
general terms, that communities of interest were inherently linked
in geography, i.e., that the "community of interest" districting
criteria was inextricably intertwined with the geographic
"importance" districting criteria." However, at no point did this
councilmember or any individual or expert discuss or present
evidence indicating the existence of particular communities of
interest, such as occupations or educational level, creating a
significant point of commonality between Kingwood and District B.
Such evidence would have mitigated the differences between
District B and Kingwood discussed by proponents of the 1997
Houston Plan. 7
d. Testimony of Attorneys with Respect to Compliance with
Shaw I and VRA Standards
Testimony by the lead redistricting attorney and Council
members at the Houston City Council hearings referenced the City
of Houston's obligation to comply with existing equal protection
and VRA standards and clearly reflected awareness of the
possibility that the redistricting would be subject to a lawsuit.20,

203. See id. at 516; see also Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at
50-54 (Feb. 26, 1997); Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at 68-71
(Apr. 2, 1997).
204. Chen 1I, 206 F.3d at 516.
205. Id. at 516-17.
206. See id. at 516.
207. Id. at 516-17.
208. Id. at 517. The lead attorney in the City of Houston's 1997 redistricting

process conceded at the City Council hearings that, in advising Council
members during the map drawing process, he was seeking to, inter alia, avoid

Section 2 and equal protection liability. Transcript of Houston City Council
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For instance, lead counsel for the 1997 Houston Plan read into the
record a discussion of the applicable law relating to redistricting,
including the City's requirement to comply with Section 2 and 5 of
the VRA, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the potential
exposure of the City's final map to litigation alleging violations
thereof."2 In so doing, he stated that race can be "a factor" in the
drawing of districts in a political map, but not the "predominant
factor."21 °
Counsel for the City also recognized that, under the VRA,
race must be taken into account in the drawing of districts such
that minority-voting rights as a group are not diluted (Section 2)
and so that there is no retrogression of minority-voting strength

(Section

5).211

He also stated that districts can be designed to carry

majority-minority population, so long as race and ethnicity are not
the predominant factor in the design, and that there are
permissible districting criteria other than race which may drive
redistricting decision making,
including preservation 2of12
communities of interest and drawing districts to be as compact
and contiguous as is practicable. 12
Counsel for the City further discussed the potential
retrogression that would occur if Kingwood were placed in a
predominantly African-American district, and that the 1997
Houston Plan had to be narrowly tailored to achieve compliance
with Section 5, i.e., in order to prevent retrogression.
He
concluded by noting that the Houston City Council passed a
resolution establishing a system designed to follow traditional
redistricting principles, which, if followed, would direct the
Houston City Council to satisfy its legal requirements. 14

Hearing at 36-37, (Feb. 26, 1997).
209. Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at 36-37, (Feb. 26, 1997).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 507 (discussing the concept of "compactness").
Both the testimony before the Houston City Council and the fifth circuit's
analysis in Chen II discussed the difference between "geographic" compactness
and "functional" compactness. Id. at 507 & n.2. "Functional" compactness

considers communities of interest along with the geography of districts, so that
mathematical and geographic compactness are sacrificed to preserve
communities of interest. Id.; Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at
11-12, 28-29, 48-49 (Apr. 2, 1997).

213. Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at 36-37 (Feb. 26, 1997).
214. Id. at 12-31; Transcript of Houston City Council Hearing at 7, 59-60, 6769 (Apr. 2, 1997). The Lead Counsel for the redistricting project opined that,
in his view, the 1997 Houston Plan annexing Kingwood to District E was

"most defensible" in any litigation challenges to the Plan. Transcript of
Houston City Council Hearing at 7, 59-60, 67-69 (Apr. 2, 1997).
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B. Chen: The Equal ProtectionChallenge to the 1997 Houston
Plan
The day that the 1997 Houston Plan was adopted, April 9,
1997, the plaintiffs in Chen, five residents of the City of Houston,
filed an equal-protection racial-gerrymandering claim challenging
the plan in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas." 5 The lawsuit sought injunctive relief to prevent
the implementation of the 1997 Houston Plan and, in so doing,
alleged that placement of Kingwood in District E was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.2 "6
Both the district court's decision in Chen I and the fifth
circuit's decision in Chen II applied Miller's predominant factor
test 2 17 and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
traditional districting principles were subordinated to race in the
annexation of Kingwood." 8 An examination of the district court's
decision in Chen I and fifth circuit's decision in Chen II, and the
evidence relied on by those decisions, may assist in the planning of
future redistricting plans.
1.

The District Court Decision in Chen I

After the plaintiffs and the City of Houston presented the
evidence and arguments to the district court in support of their
respective positions, the district court affirmed the 1997 Houston
Plan, granting summary judgment in favor of the City and against
In its
the plaintiffs in the racial-gerrymandering claims. 19
analysis, the district court relied primarily220 on evidence from two

215. Chen II, 206 F.3d at 505.
216. Chen I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 759. In addition to alleging that the 1997
Houston Plan constituted unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, the Chen
plaintiffs raised several alternative constitutional claims, including: that the
City's decision to assign Kingwood to District E violated the requirements of
ballot secrecy; violated the plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment to
petition for redress of grievances, to assemble for political purposes, and to
advocate for the candidate of their choice; and violated the Equal Protection
Clause's "one-person, one-vote" principle. Id. at 747.
217. At the time of the fifth circuit's decision in Chen II, five of the six cases
in the Shaw I line: Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, Bush, and Hunt. The Court's
2001 decision in Easley had not yet been decided.
218. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 514; Chen I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
219. Chen I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
220. Id. at 754-57. The plaintiffs and the City of Houston each presented
several sources of evidence in support of their respective positions aside from
expert reports and the City Council hearings. Id. For instance, the City of
Houston relied on, inter alia: memoranda from the City's outside attorneys
regarding the legal requirements for redistricting plans; the City of Houston's
'redistricting resolution" setting forth the criteria upon which the 1997
Houston Plan was purportedly based; the report submitted to the city council
by Mr. Jerry Ward, the individual primarily responsible for developing the
1997 Houston Plan, describing the considerations which were involved in the
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sources: (1) expert reports relating to the extent to which the
challenged districts deviated from compactness;22' and (2) the
transcript from the City Council's hearing relating to the 1997
Houston Plan.222
Despite both parties' reliance on the evidence, the district
court's focus on these two sources of evidence submitted might
suggest that, in the absence of contradictory legislative
testimony, 223 or contrary expert reports relative to whether
traditional districting criteria were subordinated to race, a court
may primarily - if not exclusively - look to these sources to
determine whether a redistricting entity has predominately relied
on race in the creation of one or more electoral districts in the
adjudication of an equal-protection racial-gerrymandering claim.
Ultimately, the district court in Chen I concluded that plaintiffs
failed to carry their burden of proving that race was the
predominant factor in the placement of Kingwood into District E,
and granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Houston.2 4
2.

The Fifth Circuit's Decision in Chen II

The plaintiffs in Chen I appealed the district court's decision
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, claiming that the
district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary
judgment.
In support of their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that
they produced enough direct and circumstantial evidence of the
predominance of race in connection with the decision making
relative to the 1997 Houston Plan and that the district court
therefore erred in granting the City's motion for summary
judgment.
In affirming the district court, the fifth circuit in Chen II, like
the district court in Chen I, primarily relied on the expert reports
and transcripts from the Houston City Council hearings to
conclude that race was not the predominant factor in the
development of the 1997 Houston Plan. Id. The plaintiffs, however, relied on
the deposition testimony of two Houston City Council members who each
testified that, in their opinion, race was the deciding factor in the placement of
the Kingwood community. Id. at 761.
221. Id. at 761. The expert reports of both parties focused upon the extent to
which the District deviated from, or conformed with, acceptable criteria for
compactness, i.e., the extent to which District E was bizarrely shaped. Id. at
761-62.
222. Id. at 758-59.
223. Significantly, the district court found that the subjective opinions of the
two council members proffered by the plaintiffs were not material. See Chen I,
9 F. Supp. 2d at 761 ("The opinions of individual council members are not
material; the relevant inquiry concerns the intent of the City through its City
Council as a legislative body.").
224. Id. at 763.
225. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 504.
226. Id. at 505.
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placement of Kingwood in District E, and therefore that the 1997
Houston Plan was not subject to strict scrutiny." In rendering its
decision, the fifth circuit addressed procedural aspects of a Federal
Appellate Court's review of a district court's ruling on a motion for
summary judgment in an equal-protection racial-gerrymander
case, which, if followed by other courts, give redistricting entities
the upper hand when defending against such claims. 8 After
making these procedural points, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the district court erred in determining that the
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to satisfy the burden of
demonstrating that race was the predominant factor in the design
of the 1997 Houston Plan.229
Since both the procedural and substantive holdings made by
the fifth circuit in Chen II may provide support for a successful
defense of intentionally designed majority-minority districts, the
following subsections will summarize the procedural and
substantive holdings
of the fifth circuit in Chen II before
discussing the fifth circuit's disposition of the plaintiffs specific
contentions.
a. Procedural themes from the fifth circuit's decision in Chen II
- redistricting cases are ripe for summary judgment in favor of
the redistricting entity when the plaintiffs burden on the
predominant factor test has not been satisfied
In Chen II the fifth circuit made three very significant points
with respect to the standard of review that a federal appellate
court should apply to a district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of a redistricting entity in an equal-protection racialgerrymandering claim. An examination of these three points
suggests that such claims are ripe for summary judgment and that
a federal court may be reluctant in such cases to disturb a
legislature's decision making in the area of redistricting.
i.

Federal courts are reluctant to disturb redistricting plans

First, the fifth circuit in Chen II distinguished its review of
lawsuits challenging redistricting plans from other categories of
decisions. In setting forth the applicable standard by which it
reviews district court rulings on motions for summary judgments,
the court cited Hunt, among others, for the proposition that its
review of such rulings "must be understood in the context of the
courts' traditional reluctance to interfere with the delicate and

227. Id. at 515.
228. See id. at 505-06 (noting the high burden of proof plaintiffs must bear to
overcome summary judgment compared to the redistricting entity who enjoys
the benefit of receiving a presumption of good faith).
229. See id. at 521-22.

2006]

Legislative Findingsin Racial GerrymanderingCases

1409

politically charged area of legislative redistricting. 2 ' ° Thus, the
fifth circuit relied on Hunt for the proposition that the "legislature
has the benefit of a presumption of good faith when it conducts
'
districting." 31
ii.

Summary judgment in favor of a redistricting entity is not
disfavored in equal-protection racial-gerrymander cases

The fifth circuit in Chen II also rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that summary judgment is disfavored in equalprotection racial-gerrymander lawsuits. In so doing, the fifth
circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Hunt by
pointing out that, in Hunt, the Supreme Court stressed that
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was inappropriate
because of the fact-sensitive nature of the intent requirement and
because the non-movant did not have the burden of persuasion on
the predominant factor issue. 2 In addition, the fifth circuit again
emphasized that "[t]he Court [in Hunt] also relied on the
traditional presumption that the legislature acted in good faith
while districting"33 The fifth circuit went on stating that "[t]he
plaintiffs here bear the burden of persuasion, and the presumption
of legislative integrity adds
to, rather than lessens, their burden
23 4
facing summary judgment."
iii. When a redistricting entity can demonstrate alternative raceneutral motives for design of its redistricting plan, a racial
gerrymander claim is ripe for summary judgment
The third point made by the fifth circuit was that a case
containing "mixed motives" advances, rather than hinders
summary judgment in favor of the redistricting entity.2 35 The court
thus rejected, prior to addressing the plaintiffs' contentions as to
the propriety of the district court's grant of the City's motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiffs' contention that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the case contained mixed
motives in that the City "proffered justifications for its actions
grounded in traditional districting principles, [even though]
it ... also conceded that race was a factor in its decisions."236 In
disposing of that argument, the court stated that:

230. Id. at 505; see also Hunt, 526 U.S. at 541 (granting the legislature a
presumption of good faith for redistricting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (explaining that "legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for
legislative consideration and determination").
231. Id. (citing Hunt, 526 U.S. at 549).
232. See Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 506.
233. See id. (citing Hunt, 526 U.S. at 544).

234. Id.
235. Id. at 507.
236. Id.
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The City of Houston's presentation of valid evidence of nonracial
intent, which transforms the case into one of mixed motives,
advances rather than hinders its case for summary judgment. We
will review the district court's grant of summary judgment using the
traditional criteria, and take into account both the presumption23 7in
favor of a legislature's good faith and a plaintiffs burden of proof.
Hence, as with its indication that federal courts should be
reluctant to interfere with a legislature's redistricting plan, the
fifth circuit in Chen II relied on the Supreme Court's recognition in
Hunt that a federal court's consideration of an equal-protection
racial-gerrymander challenge to a redistricting plan should
presume that a legislature acted in good faith when determining
whether the claimants satisfied their burden of proof on the
predominant factor test. 3 s
b. The fifth circuit' rejection in Chen II of the plaintiffs appellate
argument that there was sufficient direct evidence that race was
the predominant factor in Houston's 1997 Plan
In support of their position that they produced sufficient
direct evidence that the 1997 Houston Plan was predominantly
motivated by racial considerations, the plaintiffs relied on three
arguments.2 3 ' First, the plaintiffs argued that racial intent could
be inferred from the City's access to racial data on the precinct
level through use of a computer program that contained racial and
ethnic data at the level of voting precincts. 4 ° Second, the plaintiffs
maintained that the decision to place Kingwood in District E
rather than District B was predominantly influenced by race. 241
Third, the plaintiffs claimed that the 1997 Houston Plan
substantially maintained the borders of previous plans, and that
these borders were set by a process in which race - specifically,
the desire to create two African-American and two Hispanic single
member districts - predominated.242

237. Id.
238. Id. at 506-507.
239. See id. at 513-15.
Although the fifth circuit first addresses the
plaintiffs' procedural arguments and whether they produced enough
circumstantial or direct evidence that race predominated the decision to place
Kingwood in District E, the Court's disposition of plaintiffs' arguments
regarding the sufficiency of its direct evidence is relevant here because, in
equal protection racial discrimination cases, if the plaintiff satisfies its burden
of proof via direct evidence (an acknowledgment of illegal racial discrimination
by the relevant government decision maker) then the plaintiff has satisfied
their initial burden of proof and does not have to come forward with
circumstantial evidence. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546.
240. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 514.
241. Id. at 514.
242. Id.
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i. The use of precincts with racial data as an administrative
boundary is not evidence of racial discrimination
Although the plaintiffs in Chen II argued that the
administrative boundaries used by the City were based on
precincts with racial data, the fifth circuit held that conformity
with such administrative boundaries was neither direct nor
indirect evidence of racial discrimination because there was no
larger, more race-neutral, administrative unit that could have
been practically used in designing district boundaries.243
Moreover, the City itself was not the government unit that set
precinct size.2' 4 Because the 1997 Houston Plan conformed to the
administrative boundary of the precinct, which was the largest
and only administrative unit available, and was not set by the
City, this argument was rejected.245
ii. The fifth circuit relied almost exclusively on the legislative
testimony from council debates when determining whether the
decision to annex Kingwood was predominantly motivated by
race
The fifth circuit concluded that the City's decision to place
Kingwood in District E had three alternative justifications. One
alternative justification was to prevent retrogression.2 16 The City's
Section 5 filing and the testimony presented at the Council
hearings established the justification, and the City did not contest
the issue.4 7 According to the fifth circuit, however, "[tihe most
powerful alternative justification for the City's actions is the
nature of Kingwood and its greater community of interest overlap
with portions of District E." " To support this conclusion, the fifth
circuit reasoned that the "transcripts of the series of council
debates that led to the final vote on the districting plan
demonstrate that members of the Council discussed and evaluated
data that indicated that Kingwood's communities of interest
overlapped with District E, but were wildly at variance with
District B."249 In so concluding, the fifth circuit distinguished the

Supreme Court's rejection of this alternative justification in Shaw
II and Bush because in those cases the relevant material was not
available at the time of the council deliberations and the

243. Id. at 514.
244. Id.
245. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs' contention because they could not correlate
any city action with changes in precinct size).
246. Id. at 515.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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alternative justification was raised "after the fact and only
hypothetically motivated the districting body." 250
In relying on the testimony from the Council debates, the fifth
circuit emphasized that the proponents of the 1997 Houston Plan
did not limit their testimony to general discussions of socioeconomic indicators, but rather referred to both anecdotal and
statistical evidence comparing the average income and quality of
housing in Kingwood with that in Districts B and E. The Council
members' testimony
also discussed
the differences in
infrastructure between the two districts. 5'
Moreover, the
plaintiffs' expert witness generally confirmed the City's
assessment. 52
For the third alternative justification, the concern with
minimizing the spillover effect on one-person, one-vote concerns,
the fifth circuit also relied on testimony from the Council debates
for its conclusion." The court relied on council member testimony
and a report prepared by an expert reflecting that, if Kingwood
was placed in another district, major alterations would have to be
made to the entire districting scheme versus minor alterations
with the placement of Kingwoord in District E.21 "By placing
Kingwood in District E, the City minimized the spillover effect
maintained by one-person, one-vote concerns,
and the
corresponding mass redrawing of districts that would ensue.""'
Significantly, in setting forth its conclusions as to the
propriety of the district court's conclusions regarding the
alternative race-neutral explanations for placing Kingwood in
District E, the fifth circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the City could not rely on what the plaintiff argued was "scripted"
testimony from the Council hearings." Once again, the court
relied on the presumption of legislative good faith in redistricting
as set forth in Hunt."7 In the plaintiffs view in Chen II, the
Houston City Council debates "were mere smoke and mirrors
concocted in anticipation of precisely this lawsuit."" The fifth
circuit explained that given the "voluminous testimony" at the
Council debates and the Supreme Court's declaration in Hunt to

250. Id.
251. Id. at 516-17.
252. See id. at 516 (noting the testimony of a local university professor in

support of the City's position).
253. Id. at 517.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 517.
257. See id. (agreeing that the Council may have been aware of the
possibility of litigation but denying that such awareness creates a fact issue
regarding whether the testimony was a pretext for concealed racial

motivation).
258. Id.
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lower courts that there is a "presumption of good faith in this
area," there was no merit to the plaintiffs' contention. 2 ' Hence, for
the fourth time in its analysis, the fifth circuit in Chen II relied on
Hunt's emphasis that courts should afford legislative decision
making a presumption of good faith in redistricting litigation.
iii. Continuation of a racially motivated districting scheme
The fifth circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
City's continuation of a racially-motivated districting structure
was direct evidence that race predominated in the design of the
1997 Houston Plan."8° Even though the Justice Department had
intervened in past redistricting schemes, and the City conceded
that race was "a factor" in the design of past redistricting schemes,
the plaintiffs in Chen failed to demonstrate any specific areas
where the communities of interest were subordinated to race.2 6 '
However, the fifth circuit, in disposing of this argument, again
relied on the presumption in favor of legislative good faith set
forth by the Supreme Court in Hunt: given the fact that the
plaintiffs bore the burden of proof on this issue and the
presumption of the Council's good faith, the plaintiffs needed to
undercut the hypothesis that the City's plans were independently
and substantially justified by traditional districting factors.262
They failed to do so.2
c. The fifth circuit's rejection in Chen II of the plaintiffs'
argument that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that
race was the predominant factor in Houston's 1997 Plan
The plaintiffs in Chen II relied on only one contention to
sufficient
they presented
that
their position
support
circumstantial evidence that race was the predominant factor in
the 1997 Houston Plan. They argued, as did the North Carolina
plaintiffs in Shaw I and Bush, that the shape of the districts
contained in the Plan were sufficiently "bizarre" in relation to the
racial demographics and population densities so that the shape
itself was circumstantial evidence that race predominated in the
design of the districts contained in the 1997 Houston Plan.264 In
addressing this argument, the fifth circuit in Chen II performed a

259. Id.
260. See id. at 518 (discussing the plaintiffs claim that the "sins of past

Councils" were haunting the current council's asserted justifications).
261. See id. at 518-20.
262. See id. at 520-21.
263. Id. at 520. The court also reasoned that the passage of time lent an
additional element to the determination of the Council's intent because
maintaining established district lines is a traditional districting principle and
the City included it in its guidance for the 1997 Houston Plan. See id. at 521.
264. See id. at 507.
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comparative analysis between the shapes of the districts contained
in the 1997 Houston Plan to the respective shapes of the districts
held by the Supreme Court in Shaw I and Bush to be sufficiently
"bizarre" to raise an inference of predominance of racial
considerations in the majority-minority districts challenged
therein."
After performing the comparison, the fifth circuit in
Chen II concluded that even though the Houston districts were not
"compact," the shape was not so bizarre as to give rise to the
inference that race predominated in the legislature's decision
relative to its design of each district."
3. Chen I and Chen II Appear to be Consistent with the Supreme
Court'sDecisions in the Shaw I Line of Cases
The district court's decision in Chen I and the fifth circuit's
affirmation in Chen II appear to be consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Shaw I line of cases relative to a plaintiffs
burden of proof in equal-protection racial-gerrymander cases. In
1998, at the time of the district court's decision in Chen I, the
Supreme Court had decided Shaw I (1993), Miller (1995), Shaw II
(1996), and Bush (1996), but not Hunt (1999) or Easley (2001). As
such, the predominant factor test had already been set forth.
However, there had been no exhaustive list of race-neutral
districting principles that could be relied on as factors so as to
avoid an application of strict scrutiny.
Consistent with Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and Bush, the
district court applied Miller's predominant factor test and
considered all of the evidence presented on the issue of legislative
intent in an attempt to determine the extent to which racial
considerations in comparison with traditional districting
principles - were relied on in connection with the design of the
1997 Houston Plan and, in particular, the annexation of Kingwood
into District E."6 7 In so doing, the district court in Chen I focused
on all of the evidence presented by both parties relevant to the
factors relied on by the City Council, including the subjective
opinions of the two Council members who opposed the plan." The
district court's decision, although not specifying which districting
principles - if any - it considered the City to have relied on more
than racial considerations, granted the City's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs had not provided
sufficient evidence to satisfy their burden of proof, or to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that the City had predominately
265. See id.
266. Id. at 508. The plaintiffs in Chen II presented no demographic data

reflecting the racial nature of the districts nor any showing that the designs of
the districts were in derogation of traditional districting principles. See id.
267. Chen 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 754-63.
268. Id. at 761.
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relied on race in designing the 1997 Houston Plan.269 Thus, the
district court's decision in Chen I appears to have followed the
Supreme Court's mandate in Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and Bush,
that the plaintiffs in an equal-protection racial-gerrymandering
case have the initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence that
racial considerations, more than traditional districting principles,
predominated in the legislature's design of the plan, the failure of
which is fatal to the plaintiffs case. 7 °
The fifth circuit's 2000 affirmance of Chen I in Chen II,
although consistent with the Shaw I line of cases, added two
significant nuances to the regime of equal-protection racialgerrymander litigation under the Shaw I line of cases, which may
have been implied in the Supreme Court's decisions. In so doing,
the fifth circuit primarily relied on two sources of evidence in
making and rendering its decisions with respect to the issues on
appeal. Significantly, the fifth circuit relied on: (1) statements
made during legislative hearings by the drafters of the 1997
Houston Plan, and (2) the Section 5 filings to determine the extent
to which race was relied on in the design of the 1997 Houston
Plan. 7
The first nuance apparently set forth by the Chen II decision
was the fifth circuit's reliance on a well-developed record,
including three days of legislative hearings wherein the factors
relied on in the annexation of Kingwood were discussed by
legislators. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's 1999
decision in Hunt, wherein the Supreme Court emphasized that a
well-developed record on the issue of legislative intent is essential
to determining whether an equal-protection racial-gerrymander
claimant has satisfied its initial burden of proving that the
redistricting entity has predominantly relied on race in designing
its district plan.7 2 Indeed, the Court in Hunt noted that the only
evidence available on the issue of intent were the affidavits of two
legislators that were executed after the plan had been adopted.2 2
Unlike the Supreme Court in Hunt, the district court in Chen I
and the fifth circuit in Chen II had a litigation record available
that included transcripts from legislative hearings containing
extensive testimony by council members supporting the 1997
Houston Plan at legislative hearings made prior to the adoption of
the 1997 Houston Plan. 274 As a result, the problem of insufficient
evidence on the issue of legislative intent present in Hunt - as

269. Id. at 763.
270. See supra Part II.C.
271. Chen I, 206 F.3d at 515-16.
272. 526 U.S. at 549.
273. Id. at 544
274. Compare id., with Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 515-16, and Chen I, 9 F. Supp.
2d at 755-59.
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well as timing problems regarding legislative statements
supporting such evidence - was not present in Chen.
Second, the fifth circuit in Chen II, like the Supreme Court's
2001 decision in Easley, performed an independent examination of
the record and identified race-neutral districting principles which
were relied on by the redistricting entity more so than race. The
fifth circuit in Chen II held that preserving communities of
interest as well as one-person, one-vote concerns were the primary
race-neutral reasons for incorporating Kingwood into District E,
and..5 the Supreme Court in Easley identified "politics" as being
the primary explanation for the drawing of North Carolina District
12.176 In other words, the fifth circuit in Chen II, and the Supreme
Court in Easley not only determined that the plaintiffs failed to
carry their initial burden of proving that race was predominantly
relied upon by the redistricting entity in designing the challenged
plan, but also identified districting principles relied on more than,
or as much as with, racial considerations.
After Easley all equal-protection racial-gerrymandering
claims brought under the current regime of the Shaw I line of
cases are subject to an independent examination of the record to
determine whether a claimant has successfully carried the initial
burden under the predominant factor test of showing that race,
more than other districting principles, predominated in the
creation of one or more districts within a districting plan. Future
Supreme Court decisions might provide guidance as to whether, as
in Chen II and Easley, courts, in their application of the
predominant factor test, must identify the districting principles
that the legislature predominantly relied on. Perhaps, however,
as in Chen I, it is sufficient for a court to simply determine
whether a racial gerrymandering claimant has carried its initial
burden of proving that race was the predominant factor in the
design of the challenged districts, without identifying the raceand/or ethnic-neutral districting principles it relied on.
IV. DESIGNING UNASSAILABLE MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS BY
COMBINING THE APPROACH USED IN THE 1997 HOUSTON PLAN WITH
MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND PROCEDURAL EXPERTISE

The City of Houston's successful redistricting efforts in
connection with the annexation of Kingwood and the concomitant
adjustments made to the 1997 Houston Plan is a model for success
which may be followed by redistricting entities in both the "design"
phase and the "litigation" phase of any redistricting project. 7 '
After all of the backroom deals are made by the players, after all

275. Chen 1I, 206 F.3d at 515-16.
276. Easley, 532 U.S. at 242-44.
277. Bickerstaff, supra note 180, at 110.
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the compromises and informal turf wars are over and the elected
officials are comfortable with the final design of their respective
districts, and before any legislative hearings are held, the
redistricting players may - as in the Chen litigation - place an
unbreakable padlock on the majority-minority districts exposed to
an equal-protection racial-gerrymandering claim. In so doing,
they can identify all race-neutral justifications for the design
of any majority-minority districts contained in the final plan that
may potentially be exposed to an equal-protection racialgerrymander claim under the Shaw I line of cases and then write
a screenplay for certain elected officials to follow, performing
monologues and colloquies at the subsequent legislative hearings.
As with the strategic design of the 1997 Houston Plan,
assuming that the elected officials are on board, the officials that
are involved in the redistricting process can strategically protect
the majority-minority districts by preparing testimony for the
legislative hearings, and, of course, following through with their
testimony at the hearing.2 78 Afterwards, the redistricting entity, as
in the Chen litigation, may rely on the legislative hearings to
successfully defend the plan in any litigation based on an equalprotection gerrymander claim.
When carefully thought through, a redistricting entity may
be even better prepared than the City of Houston in the design
and defense of its 1997 Houston Plan. By combining the City of
Houston's strategy, which resulted in the successful defense of its
1997 Houston Plan in the Chen litigation, with strategic decisions
about,
inter
alia, which majority-minority
districts
may
be justified by specific testimony about race-neutral redistricting
principles, which elected officials will provide the testimony at the
legislative hearings, and the substance of their testimony, an ironclad record can support any subsequent challenge to the majorityminority districts.
Given that the legislative hearing appears to be the final
component of the "design phase of a redistricting plan, and the
filing of an equal- protection racial-gerrymander claim appears to
be the commencement of the litigation phase, the following
subsections will discuss both, and itemize the strategies which
may be used during each phase to ensure successful litigation of
majority-minority districts every time.
A.

The "Design"Phase

1. Identify "Problem"Majority-MinorityDistrictsthat are
Exposed to Equal-protectionracial-gerrymanderclaims
Since the nature

of equal-protection

278. See supra discussion Part V.A.

racial-gerrymander
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claims is to challenge the motivation of the legislative decision
makers relative to the design of specific districts within a
redistricting plan, 79 then an initial assessment of which majorityminority districts are exposed to such claims will likely reveal
which districts are potential targets of such claims. If the Shaw I
line of cases are of any guidance on this issue, there appear to be
at least four indicators that determine which majority-minority
districts are exposed to equal-protection racial-gerrymander
claims. Clearly, as gleaned from Shaw I and Bush, one indicator
is the shape of the district. ° As with North Carolina's
Congressional District 12 challenged in Shaw I, Shaw II, Hunt,
and Easley, and Texas Congressional District 18 challenged in
Bush, a "bizarrely" shaped majority-minority district might be a
target of an equal-protection racial-gerrymander claim."' As in
Chen II, comparing bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts
with the districts challenged in Shaw I and Bush might reveal
which districts are potential targets for an equal-protection racialgerrymander challenge.
A second indicator of exposure arises when a redistricting
entity derives a district by dividing a district, or neighboring
district where an ethnic or racial group was previously the
majority, into two districts. 82 A third indicator that a majorityminority district might be exposed to an equal-protection racialgerrymander claim is the inclusion within a districting plan of a
majority-minority district for the first time.2
Finally, a fourth indicator is the involvement of the Justice
Department; in particular, a Justice Department direction to a
redistricting entity to deliberately use race in the design of a
majority-minority district in order to avoid retrogression and/or to

279. See Polish Am. Cong. v. City of Chicago, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 11071108 (examining equal protection claim alleging that the City of Chicago's

entire redistricting project discriminated against citizens of Polish ancestry
and in favor of members of all of the other European and non-European ethnic
groups).
280. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 639-49; Bush, 517 U.S. at 957.
281. See Easley, 532 U.S at 241-57; Hunt, 326 U.S. at 545-54; Bush, 517 U.S.
at 957-89); Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 904-08; Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 639-58.
282. See, e.g., United Jewish Org., 430 U.S. at 147-48 (challenging state
senate and assembly districts of the New York State legislature because they
divided members of the Hasidic Jewish community who were previously the

majority population in the design of the electoral districts districts).

into two

283. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 902-03 (first majority African-American
congressional district in Georgia); King v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 979
F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (first majority-Latino Illinois Congressional

district challenged in an equal protection racial gerrymander claim and
upheld under strict scrutiny as being narrowly tailored to comply Section 2 of
the VRA).
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comply with Section 2.2" Given that the Court in Miller indicated
that there is no compelling interest in complying with the Justice
Department's interpretation of the VRA, the Justice Department's
involvement in the design of a majority-minority district appears
to increase the redistricting entity's exposure to an equalprotection racial-gerrymander claim.285
2. Determine Which Race-Neutral DistrictingPrinciplesJustify
the Design of the Majority-MinorityDistrict(s)Exposed to EqualProtectionRacial-GerrymanderClaims
The architects of the exposed majority-minority district(s)
(the elected officials in that district and the districts that border
the district) should also make a determination as to the extent to
which, if any, race-neutral traditional principles provide
alternative justifications for the district's design. Assuming there
are such alternative justifications, and one or more districting
principles correspond with racial considerations, then, as in Chen,
such justifications will likely be the basis for the redistricting
entity's litigation defense. As long as the redistricting entity can
prove that those districting principles are not subordinated to
racial considerations in the exposed district's design, then there is
a basis for planning the legislative hearing, and winning any
subsequent litigation.'
3. All of the Public Officials Involved in the Decision Making
Relative to the Exposed Majority-MinorityDistrict(s)Must be On
Board
After the exposed majority-minority districts are identified,
and after the race-neutral justifications for those districts have
been selected, the elected officials whose district(s) comprise the
majority-minority district that has been selected for protection
must be on board for preparing for the legislative hearing and any
subsequent litigation. Since the motivation for the placement of
the district boundaries is at the heart of equal-protection racialgerrymandering cases, the elected official of the majority-minority
district at issue, as well as the elected officials in each and every
adjacent district, will likely be the key witnesses at any
subsequent legislative hearings or other proceedings at which
evidence is provided concerning the motivation and considerations
284. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 957, 960-61, 970 (noting the influence of the
Department of Justice in the State's use of race in a redistricting plan); Miller,
515 U.S. at 907-08 (noting the objections of the Department of Justice to
districts that are not majority-minority).
285. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 922-26 (acknowledging that a Department of
Justice interpretation of the VRA to compel race-based districting "by
definition raises a seriously constitutional question").
286. Id.
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pertaining to the placement of a challenged district's boundaries.
If those elected officials are on board, then evidence as to the
motivation for the placement of the borders comprising the
boundaries of the exposed majority-minority district can be
carefully protected until the time for presentment, i.e., the
legislative hearing.
4. Hold a HearingDuring Which the Public Officials From
Exposed Majority-MinorityDistrictProvide Testimony Supporting
the Race-NeutralAlternative Justificationsfor the District'sDesign
Legislative entities can learn an important lesson from the
City of Houston's 1997 redistricting strategy in connection with
the decision to hold legislative hearings during which proponents
of the design plans, including the specific designers of any
particular district, can articulate the race-neutral justifications for
the placement of district boundaries. If a legislative hearing is
held at the conclusion of the planning, and there is a script or
equivalent outline for the elected officials whose districts
are exposed, then proponents of a redistricting plan, including the
proponents of the design of particular majority-minority districts,
can, as in the case of the 1997 Houston Plan, provide specific
testimony pertaining to alternative justifications for design of the
exposed majority-minority districts.
Optimally, the source of the testimony as to the alternative
race-neutral justifications will be the elected official of the exposed
majority-minority district itself, along with the testimony of the
elected officials in each of the adjacent districts about
the motivations relative to the placement of the borders
comprising the exposed district's boundaries. Thus, as with the
City of Houston's 1997 redistricting project, the proponents of
a redistricting plan should be prepared to testify at the hearing as
to the districting principles relied on, and to testify that those
redistricting principles were not subordinated to racial
considerations.
To the extent that opponents
of an
alternative design testify, the opponents' level of involvement in
the decision making will likely be a factor to consider in
subsequent litigation.
B. The "Litigation"Phase
1. Throughout Litigation,Litigators Should PracticeArtful
Drafting of Pleadings and Motion Practice to Secure a Position of
Leverage so that Summary Judgment May be Entered in Favor of
the RedistrictingEntity
Assuming that individual majority-minority district(s) are
challenged in an equal-protection racial-gerrymander claim based
on the standard articulated in the Shaw I line of cases, skilled
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litigators understand that the key to success is often found in
artful, but honest and concise, drafting of pleadings, brief writing
and motion practice.287 Whether in opposition to a complaint
containing an equal-protection gerrymandering claim, in
opposition to a motion by the complainant for a preliminary
injunction, in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, or in
support of the redistricting entity's motion for summary judgment,
and/or in the drafting of briefs to emphasize the evidence of intent
contained in the transcript of the testimony of the elected officials
articulating race-neutral reasons for the design of the challenged
majority-minority districts, skillful drafting and motion practice
might give the redistricting entity an edge - as it obviously did
for the City of Houston in the Chen litigation 8 - in terms of
achieving the objective of avoiding equal protection liability and
the possibility of a court ordered redrawing of the challenged
district(s). Indeed, a counterclaim by the redistricting entity
seeking a declaratory judgment that the challenged majorityminority district(s) do not violate the equal-protection standard set
forth by the Shaw I line of cases might be a useful leveraging tool
for the redistricting entity,289 because then both sides must pursue,
and defend against the issue of whether race and/or ethnicity was
the predominant factor in the design of the challenged majorityminority district.
2. The Legislature'sFinal RedistrictingPlan,and the Legislative
Findings on the Issue of Legislative Intent are Entitled to a
Presumptionof Good Faith
If, when the time comes for the district court to consider a
motion for summary judgment or a trial, plaintiffs attempt to
attack the credibility of the testimony or other evidence adduced
during the legislative hearings, the redistricting entity can, as did
the City of Houston in Chen 1I, argue that testimony presented at
the legislative hearings is entitled to a presumption of good
faith."0 Relying on Hunt for this proposition can, as it did in Chen
287. Michael Deasy, Trial Practice: How to Win Cases and Influence Judges,
12th Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference (July 14-17, 2005), available
at 071405 ABI-CLE 99 (Westlaw).
288. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 504-06.
289. See In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 25E, 863 So. 2d
1176 (Fla. 2003) (providing an example of the use of declaratory relief to
render a resolution plan valid). Florida Attorney General filed a petition for
Declaratory Judgment to determine the validity of a State House of
Representatives Resolution that adopted three State House Representative
Districts. Id. at 1177.
The court determined the plan satisfied equal
protection one-person, one-vote requirements and Florida state constitution
requirements. Id. at 1178.
290. See generally Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 483-86 (5th
Cir. 1999) (exemplifying an alternative strategy for redistricting entities that
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II, operate as a procedural shield to any attacks on the merits of
the redistricting entity's reliance on the testimony adduced at the
legislative hearings."l Until overruled, Hunt's presumption of
legislative good faith appears immutable.
3. A RedistrictingEntity May Rely on the Doctrine of Judicial
Deference to Legislative Findings to Support Its Position as to the
Merits of its LitigationDefense Against an Equal-Protection
Racial-GerrymanderClaim
In any given litigation, a redistricting entity may invoke
precedent indicating that the adjudicating court must defer to
legislative "findings,"'92 such as testimony presented on the issue of
legislative intent from legislative hearings, when making the
determination of whether race was the predominant factor in the
placement of the boundaries of a challenged district. 92 Since the
transcript from any legislative hearing likely contains ample
testimony as to the factors relied on in the design of the challenged
majority-minority district and reflects race-neutral alternative
justifications for the district's design, the redistricting entity may
rely on it every time to achieve victory. There is no reason why
this strategy should not prevail, as it did in the Chen litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
With the benefit of the City of Houston's successful
redistricting strategy in 1997, resulting in the Chen II decision,
redistricting entities can now avoid the unnecessary cost and
expense often associated with litigation derived from political turf
wars. Careful planning, political compromise, attention to detail,
and artful lawyering can result in a redistricting victory and the
maintenance of the political status quo in any given system. Shaw
I and its progeny have created a standard for courts to apply in the

do not hold legislative hearings). If the legislative decision makers are on
board for any subsequent litigation then it is possible to achieve the same

result without previously recorded testimony. Id. Even though there was no
legislative hearing in Theriot, the public official in the challenged Louisiana
Parish as well as the public officials in the immediately adjacent Parishes
testified at trial that the primary motivation for the placement of the borders
of the challenged districts were one-person, one-vote concerns, preserving

incumbency, and compliance with Section 2 of the VRA. Id. Significantly, all
of the public officials who were involved in the design of the challenged
majority-minority district testified at a bench trial in Theriot. Id. Hence,
attorneys can use the same strategy and call the involved public officials to
give testimony as to race-neutral alternative justifications. Id.

291. Chen 11, 206 F.3d at 518-20.
292. See Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that
federal courts must defer to legislative decision making relative to

redistricting plans).
293. Id.
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adjudication of equal-protection racial-gerrymander cases. Living
with this standard is easy: just follow the rules.

